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PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Richard L. Marcus* 
It is hard to turn around nowadays without hearing about the 
malaise in legal scholarship.1 For example, Richard Posner, a 
former president of the Harvard Law Review, announced in that 
periodical's centenary issue that the Review "may have reached 
the peak of its influence-may, indeed, have started its journey 
down the mountain."2 If even the august Harvard Law Review is 
sliding, one does sense an ancien regime aroma of decay. But 
Posner's main message was that scholarship has become more 
diverse, and that the hegemony of traditional doctrinal analysis 
has been broken.3 More generally, the malaise is attributed to 
the supposed disappearance of doctrinal challenges due to the 
success of the doctrinal analysts of the past. Others have gone 
farther, however. They argue that "legal scholarship can best be 
described as an open scandal ... since the late fifties,"" and 
that, in the face of such events, "[t]hose with true intellectual 
courage would abandon the law and become full-time social 
scientists."11 For these critics, it seems that only a social science 
diet can suffice. 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., Pomona College, 1969; J.D., University 
of California, Berkeley, 1972. I am indebted to Steve Burbank, Tom Mengler, and Elaine 
Shoben for comments on an earlier draft, and to Aaron Shepley for research assistance. 
1. For symposia exploring this sort of problem, see Symposium on Legal Scholar-
ship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981); American Legal Scholarship: 
Directions and Dilemmas, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 403 (1983). 
2. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-87, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 761, 761 (1987). It is perhaps worth noting that Posner was the president of the 
Review in 1962, presumably before this decline began. See 75 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1962) 
(masthead). 
3. See Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113 
(1981) ("[D]octrinal analysis ... is and should remain the core of legal scholarship 
.... "). 
4. Schlegel, Searching For Archimedes-Legal Education, Legal Scholarship, and 
Liberal Ideology, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 103, 103 (1984). 
5. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as Univer-
sity, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 437, 439 (1983). Professor Priest admits, however, that he is 
aware of no scholar who has done so, perhaps a reflection of the differences in salary 
between law schools and social science departments. Professor Priest suggests another 
explanation for gravitation away from doctrinal analysis among those who remain in the 
law school-that the reoriented scholar finds it easy to be prolific: 
647 
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In this atmosphere of self-doubt, it is appropriate to reflect on 
the value and continuing importance of successful legal scholar-
ship of the past. In this Article, I will examine Professor Abram 
Chayes's 1976 article The Role of the Judge in Public Law Liti-
gation.6 Professor Chayes began the article modestly enough, ob-
serving that it was "a sketch of work in progress," composed of 
"preliminary hypotheses, as yet unsupported by much more 
than impressionistic documentation."' Nevertheless, the article 
was promptly embraced as a classic, perhaps an icon.8 But icons 
usually influence only the previously converted; explaining the 
article's success and assessing its lasting importance therefore 
remain challenging. 
My purpose is to try to determine whether the article has had 
more than a talismanic impact. On this, the returns are mixed. 
Measured in terms of doctrinal impact, a traditional yardstick 
for evaluating legal scholarship, the article was a failure, as later 
carping by Chayes about decisions of the Burger Court con-
firms.9 But this fate may have been inevitable since the article 
was bereft of any doctrinal prescription. Perhaps more basically, 
Chayes's focus on public law litigation seems ill-conceived be-
cause the incidence of the kind of lawsuits he had in 
mind-school desegregation and prison conditions cases-was 
waning even as he wrote. Taking a broader view, however, one 
finds that Chayes's article connects directly with today's major 
procedural issues-coping with the tort "crisis," managerial 
judging, and the increasing enthusiasm among judges (and 
others) for mediation rather than adjudication. The emergence 
of these issues can be traced to judges' experience with the kinds 
of cases Chayes was describing, and resolution of the problems 
they raise requires, as Chayes suggested, reconsidering the clas-
Most (including me) justify to themselves mining the intersection of the disci-
plines: employing behavioral theory to criticize the law. This approach makes 
possible rapid insights in comparison with ordinary legal scholarship, as should 
well be expected. A well-drafted set of rules will have anticipated most objec-
tions that derive from the ideas that dominate standard legal thought. But such 
rules will be as vulnerable as an alien who cannot speak the native language to 
the criticisms of a science with different presuppositions and organizing 
thoughts. 
Id. Priest admits that "[s]cholarship of this nature-the criticism of one language by 
another-is essentially shallow." Id. 
6. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976). 
7. Id. at 1281 n.*. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 29-38. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
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sical model of adversary litigation posited by Lon Fuller.10 As a 
result, the Public Law Litigation article may be viewed as a cat-
alyst of the current academic renaissance in thought and re-
search about procedure, certainly an impressive legacy. 
The conclusion that Chayes's article had wide effect does not 
mean, however, that traditional legal scholarship may rest easy 
in the face of charges of malaise. As hinted by Chayes's unpre-
tentious description, the article itself defies categorization as 
traditional legal scholarship, and the causal connection between 
the article and events since 1976 seems fairly tenuous. Accord-
ingly, its success seems an unusual, albeit not unique, event that 
contributed to new and innovative ways of addressing legal is-
sues. For most legal academics, such innovative undertakings are 
not likely to prove successful; even Chayes could not reasonably 
look toward enjoying such success again.11 
I. THE ARTICLE 
Even for those who have studied the Public Law Litigation 
article, it is useful to revisit its central themes. The starting 
point was the classical adversary model of litigation that was 
most thoroughly examined and justified by Lon Fuller.12 This 
nineteenth-century vision of litigation was highly individualistic, 
conceiving of the law as limited to enforcing private voluntary 
arrangements (which linked, of course, to Fuller's interest in 
contract law). This focus was reinforced by the academy's 
Langdellian preoccupation with appellate opinions as technical 
exercises in explication of "scientifically" derived principles of 
private law.13 Together, these tendencies left the trial judge al-
most entirely out of the picture, as both the litigants and the 
appellate courts were perceived as the prime actors in the litiga-
tion scene. 14 These attitudes also assumed that litigation had 
10. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). 
11. In any event, it seems that Chayes has other fish to fry. See Chayes, Nicaragua, 
the United States and the World Court, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985). 
12. See Fuller, supra note 10. 
13. For an examination of Langdell's use of legal science, see Hoeflich, Law & Geom-
etry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1986). 
14. Indeed, Chayes seems preoccupied with the interests of his late nineteenth-cen-
tury predecessors at Harvard Law School. In Public Law Litigation, he concentrated on 
"the academic debate about the judicial function," which had focused on the technical 
skill exhibited in a few appellate opinions. Chayes, supra note 6, at 1285-86. There is no 
particular reason to believe that trial judges shared the attitudes of Harvard law profes-
sors, however, so the significance of those attitudes for judicial activity is unclear. 
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certain fixed characteristics: it focused on a dispute between two 
individuals, was controlled by the parties, did not affect others 
in ways that concerned the courts, and turned on evaluation of 
information about past events. This backward-looking orienta-
tion, in turn, resulted from the fact that the remedy flowed di-
rectly from the finding of a violation. 
Whether this vision accurately reflected what was really hap-
pening in trial courts seemed unimportant until the Realists ex-
posed the limitations of the classical view after World War I. 
Chayes recognized that the classical view was a doubtful descrip-
tion of litigation even in the nineteenth century, asserting that 
"[s]ometime after 1875, the private law theory of civil adjudica-
tion became increasingly precarious in the face of a growing 
body of legislation designed explicitly to modify and regulate ba-
sic social and economic arrangements."1 ~ The country increas-
ingly embraced private enforcement of public norms, a curious 
compromise between the regulatory and the individualistic ide-
als: instead of relying on government lawyers to enforce public 
norms, the idea was to leave the initiative to affected citizens, 
and the actual enforcement to judges. This new model of litiga-
tion hit full swing in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education,16 
as federal courts tried to make local officials comply with an in-
creasingly broad menu of constitutional requirements, an effort 
that still seemed to be in high gear as Chayes wrote. Indeed, he 
began with the doubtful assumption that the "dominating char-
acteristic of modern federal litigation" was that it focused not on 
private rights but on "the vindication of constitutional or statu-
tory policies. "17 
All this was too familiar to be noteworthy; Chayes's new step 
was to reflect on the impact the emerging trends had on the 
classical vision of litigation and the related stresses they placed 
on a variety of procedural rules and forms. In this, he was acting 
as a sort of Latter Day Realist, cataloging the differences be-
15. Id. at ·1288. In a footnote, Chayes explained that he chose 1875 as the approxi-
mate date because general federal question jurisdiction was first granted to the federal 
courts in 1871 and the "interaction between economic regulation and the fourteenth 
amendment" dated from Supreme Court decisions of the 1870's. Id. at 1288-89 n.35. 
16 .. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
17. Chayes, supra note 6, at 1284. This seems to be a qualitative rather than a quan-
titative judgment. To a large extent, it seems to depend on the fact that academics find 
these cases interesting. Chayes tells us that "[t]he cases that are the focus of professional 
debate, law review and academic comment, and journalistic attention are overwhelm-
ingly, I think, new model cases." Id. at 1304. Below, I suggest that the supposedly distin-
guishing features of public law litigation are not in fact so distinct. See infra text accom-
panying notes 83-128. 
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tween what judges were actually doing and the classical vision of 
what they should be doing, and pointing out how the existing 
rules therefore failed to guide judges in handling the new 
problems presented by such litigation. In the process, he devel-
oped a morphology of public law litigation that contrasted 
sharply with the Fulleresque vision: Far from being a tightly 
confined confrontation between two individuals, the new litiga-
tion had a "sprawling and amorphous" party structure that re-
sulted from its ambiguous contours.18 At the center of the action 
stood the judge, who had to take control of the entire litigation 
process in order to fashion a decree that would achieve the regu-
latory purpose. This effort became necessary because of the 
broad effect of the decree, and because the finding of a violation 
provided little information about the remedy that should be 
used to undo the wrong. For example, a finding that a school 
system was illegally segregated, or that the deficiencies in a 
prison violated the eighth amendment rights of the prisoners, 
told the judge little about what should be done to make the situ-
ation legal. As a consequence, the principal fact-finding activity 
tended to be prospective and supervisory, as the judge tried to 
determine what steps would correct the violation. In order to 
avoid the pitfalls of crafting a decree in such uncertain waters, 
the judge would often try to pressure the parties into negotiating 
a decree. On the whole, Chayes concluded, a suit concerning the 
conditions in a prison or a school is "recognizable as a lawsuit 
only because it takes place in a courtroom before an official 
called a judge. "19 
This shift in litigation models eroded traditional assumptions 
about how several procedural rules should be applied. Most sig-
nificantly, the new litigation placed extreme stress on rules gov-
erning standing, and on the closely related question of party 
joinder, whether through necessary party practice or interven-
tion. Such difficulties were compounded by the class action, 
which Chayes opined would never "be taught to behave in accor-
dance with the precepts of the traditional model of adjudica-
tion."20 Equally important was the shift in the function of the 
judge-hence the title of the article-who became "the domi-
nant figure in organizing and guiding the case. "21 In relying on 
district judges to superintend the details of complex public insti-
18. Chayes, supra note 6, at 1302. 
19. Id. at 1302. 
20. Id. at 1291. 
21. Id. at 1284. 
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tutions, sometimes with the assistance of a squadron of special 
masters or other underlings, "[w]e may not yet have reached the 
investigative judge of the continental systems, but we have left 
the passive arbiter of the traditional model a long way 
behind. "22 
Is this a bad thing? Turning to this question, Chayes appeared 
to be a receptive agnostic who urged an "hospitable reception" 
to the new developments in litigation.23 He was, however, trou-
bled by the murkiness of the legal limitations on trial court in-
novation in public law litigation. 24 Recognizing the need for 
somebody to implement constitutional guarantees, Chayes sug-
gested that judges had a variety of institutional and professional 
attributes that would assist them in meeting the challenges of 
that task. 
In sum, this article is a distinctive piece of legal scholarship 
for several reasons. First, it is almost bereft of traditional doc-
trinal analysis. At most, it describes ways in which doctrine does 
not fit what is happening in court; Chayes overtly undertook 
only to describe shifts in activity and suggest implications. Sec-
ond, the article is highly impressionistic. Although it cites cases, 
it uses them neither as authority nor as a source of empirical 
data. The empirical work, Chayes suggested, needed yet to be 
done. Third, it is far from specific on how the rules that are dis-
cussed should be regauged to accommodate the shift Chayes de-
scribed in the character of litigation. At most, the article might 
act as a stimulus for work by others that would give content to 
these musings. Finally, it tied the characteristics of "mundane" 
procedural rules to broad issues of social policy, hardly the norm 
of much procedural scholarship at the time. 
Postscript: Somewhat more than six years later, Chayes revis-
ited the subjects raised in his Public Law Litigation article in a 
Foreword to the Supreme Court issue of the Harvard Law Re-
view. 211 There he assessed the record of the Burger Court in cop-
ing with the tensions he had identified earlier, noting that "[t]he 
long summer of social reform that occupied the middle third of 
the century was drawing to a close" by the mid-1970's.26 Em-
ploying traditional doctrinal analysis, Chayes then dissected the 
Court's efforts to curb the public law litigation movement by re-
22. Id. at 1298. 
23. Id. at 1313. 
24. See id. at 1313. 
25. Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and 
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982). 
26. Id. at 7. 
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affirming limitations on standing, curtailing some aspects of 
class actions, and trying to insist on a direct connection between 
remedy and wrong. In sum, the Court tried to make public law 
litigation over into an "effigy of the traditional lawsuit."27 Nev-
ertheless, Chayes concluded, "the attributes of public law litiga-
tion are strongly resistant to conscious efforts at reversal," so 
that "even a conservative Court is reduced, perforce, to practic-
ing public law litigation."28 
II. THE SPLASH 
It is hard to know what reception Chayes expected when the 
Public Law Litigation article appeared. Clearly, the article rep-
resented a great deal of work, but equally clearly, he viewed it as 
tentative and exploratory. Even more obviously, this was not a 
doctrinal breakthrough that could be taken up by courts or com-
mentators. Instead, it was a stream-of-consciousness invitation 
to further work that might or might not have attracted the at-
tention of others. 
Chayes must have been gratified by the reception his article 
received; any law professor would be. To begin with, he was 
showered with overt accolades. Professor Kellis Parker of Co-
lumbia lauded the article as a "brilliant discussion,"29 and Pro-
fessor Richard Fallon of Harvard (and several others) labelled it 
"seminal."30 In his article on public law remedies, Judge Frank 
Coffin acknowledged that he was "indebted to Abram Chayes" 
27. Id. at 8. 
28. Id. at 57. Chayes found this to result from the pervasive shift in the nature of 
litigation typified by school desegregation and like cases, but hardly limited to them, and 
not dependent on a "liberal" decision of the merits: 
When, for example, the Court pronounces on the constitutionality of an indem-
nity scheme for nuclear accidents or the existence of a statutory requirement for 
deinstitutionalization of retarded persons, the essential character of the litiga-
tion is the same whether the Court upholds the claim or rejects it. Whatever the 
outcome, the Court is not engaged in settling a dispute between private individ-
uals, or even between an individual and a public official. It is resolving a contro-
versy growing out of "the systemic effects" of government action. Such decisions 
will necessarily have far-reaching effects on myriads of persons not individually 
before the Court and on political, economic, and institutional structures. 
Id. at 57-58 (footnote omitted). The same might, of course, be said of the invalidation of 
New Deal legislation during the 1930's, but Chayes's claim that more litigation has these 
characteristics now than it did in the 1930's seems beyond debate. 
29. Parker & Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 771, 771 
(1978). 
30. Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Ju-
risprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1 n.1 (1984). 
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for his analytical framework. 81 Another commentator asserted 
that "[t]he debate over public law litigation stems largely from 
the seminal article by Professor Chayes. "82 Indeed, some seem to 
treat the whole idea of public law litigation as Chayes's personal 
property. 33 Finally, the article received that highest of trib-
utes-mild praise from Mark Tushnet-who called it "one of 
the few stimulating articles _on court procedure in recent 
years."34 
As measures of success, these explicit accolades are borne out 
by cruder measures of impact. The crudest is simple numbers. 
By 1985, a commentator who actually counted the number of 
citations of articles reported that the article already ranked 
Number Eleven on the all-time citation list, and that it was 
third among all articles in citation frequency since 1977. 311 
This enviable citation record does not depend upon repeated 
citation by law students preparing notes or comments on the 
season's most exciting legal development. To the contrary, the 
article is almost never cited by law students, even though it has 
been excerpted in several casebooks. 36 Not only are the people 
citing the article full-fl.edged judges, lawyers, or academics, but 
among them are many of the most distinguished participants in 
the current legal life of the nation. Among judges who also write 
for law reviews, the list includes (in addition to Judge Frank 
Coffin, noted above) Harry Edwards, Henry Friendly (twice), 
31. Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Call For Exploration, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 983, 
989 n.11 (1979). 
32. Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, 
and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger 
Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343, 362 (1985). 
33. See, e.g., Clune & Lindquist, What "Implementation" Isn't: Toward a General 
Framework for Implementation Research, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1044, 1086 ("[D]eseg-
regation lawsuits are the prototypes of Abram Chayes' 'public law litigation.' "). 
34. Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public 
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307, 1357 (1979). 
35. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540, 1550 n.45 
(1985). It should be noted that Shapiro's article pays no attention to citation by courts; 
only citation in another law review counts for this listing. See id. at 1545. 
As an amusing measure of the article's power as a citation magnet, it is worth noting 
that at least one citation attributed to it by Shepards actually belongs to Chayes's 1982 
Foreword, supra note 25, instead. See 20 SHEPARDS LAW REVIEW CITATIONS 221 (Jan. 
1988) (indicating that the Public Law Litigation article is cited at 468 U.S. 782, when in 
fact the citation (in a dissent by Justice Brennan) is to the Foreword). 
36. See R. COVER, 0. F1ss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 389-402 (1988); R. FIELD, B. 
KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 279-80 (5th 
ed. 1984); 0. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 294-99, 305-07 (1985); D. LOUISELL, 
G. HAZARD & C. TAIT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 1083-89 (5th 
ed. 1983); R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 9-13, 707-12 (1985); see also G. 
HAZARD & J. VETTER, PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 42-58 (1987). 
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Patrick Higginbotham, Benjamin Kaplan, Richard Posner, 
Antonin Scalia, Roger Traynor, and Jack Weinstein. Among aca-
demics, the list includes an array of prominent persons:37 · Lea 
Brilmayer, Mauro Cappelletti, Erwin Chermerinsky, Robert 
Cover, Archibald Cox, Kenneth Culp Davis, Thomas Ehrlich, 
Melvin Eisenberg, John Hart Ely, Owen Fiss, Kent Greenawalt, 
Erwin Griswold, A.E. Dick Howard, Kenneth Karst, Duncan 
Kennedy, John Langbein, Karl Klare, Jerry Mashaw, Ian Mac-
neil, Frank Michaelman, Henry Monaghan, Phillipe Nonet, 
Lawrence Sager, Stephen Saltzburg, Martin Shapiro, Girardeau 
Spann, Cass Sunstein, Joel Yellin, and Mark Yudof. 
The subject matter of articles that cite Public Law Litigation 
is similarly diverse. In addition to articles on issues of procedure 
or constitutional litigation, the article has been cited in articles 
on a variety of other subjects: family law, employment discrimi-
nation, administrative law in Japan, SEC enforcement suits, cor-
porate law, court-supervised adjustments in long-term contracts, 
evidence, antitrust, national park legislation, zoning, and the 
role of the courts in dealing with nuclear power. 
The breadth of subjects covered and the diversity of people 
citing the article suggest a further reason to view this citation 
record as remarkable. These people did not come across this ar-
ticle by conventional legal research. Instead, they cited the arti-
cle because they were familiar with it, impressed enough t9 re-
member it, and convinced that it was worth citing to make a 
point. This is a greater accolade than any explicit praise, for it 
indicates that the writer has made a lasting impression on a 
wide variety of influential people. 
A closer examination of the citation history, however, raises 
questions. Most seem merely to invoke Chayes's article or the 
"public law litigation" label rather than considering the reason-
ing process underlying the article. To those who feel that Chayes 
has a sort of proprietary interest in the idea of public law litiga-
tion, the citation may be nothing more than a bow to him. More 
often, people cite the article as a kind of talisman, or as a substi-
tute for describing the phenomenon. Some even seem to view 
the self-consciously nonempirical observations that Chayes made 
in the article as a substitute for empirical proof that what he 
described actually was occurring. 38 One could conclude that the 
37. This list is incomplete. It has been edited to give the reader a feel for the variety 
involved, not to suggest that those not listed are not important. 
38. See Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal 
District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 68 (1981); Ehrlich, 
Charles H. Miller Lecture-Lawyers and Their Public Responsibilities, 46 TENN. L. REV. 
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article is all things to all people; like some pieces of great litera-
ture, it offers almost everyone a pithy quotation that can be 
used to good effect in connection with one's own work. At the 
least, citing the article shows that one is in tune with the times. 
One is therefore left to ask why this article received such at-
tention. By 1976, the concept of public law was hardly new. 
Neither was the phenomenon of public law litigation wholly new. 
For some time, commentators had been writing about the "new 
wave" lawyers who brought nontraditional cases. 39 Others had 
recognized that this activity raised problems that were difficult 
to explain in traditional terms. A notable example is John Daw-
son's series of articles on the curious evolution of the law of un-
derwriting attorneys' fee awards in public interest litigation, 
which appeared in the Harvard Law Review during the period 
Chayes was presumably working on his article;'0 Beyond that, 
concern about the legitimacy of judicial efforts to implement so-
cial policy through structural decrees was widespread. The 1968 
and 1972 presidential campaigns, as well as congressional efforts 
to curtail school desegregation remedies, show widespread dis-
satisfaction with such judicial activism.'u On a more academic 
plane, others had probed the problem before Chayes.u 
The most facile explanation for the article's splash is that 
nothing succeeds like success. However things may have changed 
by the time Posner wrote for the one-hundredth anniversary of 
the Harvard Law Review in 1987,43 as of 1976 the magazine was 
713, 719 (1979); Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 38 
(1982); Remington, Circuit Council Reform: A Boat Hook for Judges and Administra-
tors, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 695, 700-01. Somewhat startlingly, even judges draw on 
Chayes's article for what seems to be empirical support for statements about the devel-
opment and characteristics of modem litigation. See, e.g., Welch v. State Dep't of High-
ways, 780 F.2d 1268, 1288 (5th Cir. 1986) (Brown, J., dissenting); Wright v. Regan, 656 
F.2d 820, 837 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367 n.4 (7th 
Cir. 1980); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1978). 
39. E.g., Riley, The Challenge of the New Lawyers: Public Interest and Private Cli-
ents, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547 (1970); Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 
YALE L.J. 1069 (1970). For an examination of the phenomenon, which appeared about 
the same time as Chayes's article, see Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on 
Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976). 
40. See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees 
from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974); Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1974). 
41. See Goldberg, The Adm"inistration's Anti-Busing Proposals-Politics Makes Bad 
Law, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 319 (1972); Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Juris-
diction of the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 
(1976). 
42. See, e.g., Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 PUB. INTEREST 104 (1975). 
43. Posner, supra note 2. 
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still riding high. It was the clear leader in frequency of citation/' 
and had a circulation that was roughly twice that of its nearest 
law review competitor, and at least four times as large as most 
law reviews.•Cj Coupled with the wide circulation is an undenia-
ble Old Boy Network explanation for at least some of the cita-
tion history-the frequent citation of the article by Harvard 
professors would seem to result from something more than the 
fact that they get their school's review for free. Moreover, the 
article was particularly favorably placed because it was in the 
same issue as the much-cited Developments on class actions, a 
study that many people who would find Chayes's message in-
triguing would likely want to refer to often.46 Add to that the 
great felicity of Chayes's prose. It is hard to resist interesting 
thoughts expressed by one who can, for example, describe the 
trial judge's refusal to certify a class action as follows: "[W]hat if 
the trial judge refuses to call the spirit from the vasty deep? 
Who can challenge his refusal to cast the magic spell?""7 Where 
that person is a prominent professor at Harvard and has pub-
44. Thus, Maru ranked 278 legal periodicals on the basis of number of times cited 
during 1972 and found that the Harvard Law Review ranked first. The Yale Law Jour-
nal ranked second, having been cited approximately 63% as often as Harvard. The Co-
lumbia Law Review ranked third, having been cited approximately 47% as often as 
Harvard. Only 21 other reviews had been cited even 10% as often as Harvard. Maru, 
Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 227, 234. 
45. As of November 20, 1975, the Harvard Law Review reported that its total paid 
circulation was 10,193. 89 HARV. L. REV. v (Dec. 1975). By way of contrast, the Yale Law 
Journal reported total subscriptions of 4275 as of September 1976. Form opposite 86 
YALE L.J. 384 (1976). The Columbia Law Review reported total paid circulation of 3828 
as of October 1976. Form opposite 76 CoLUM. L. REV. 905 (1976). The Minnesota Law 
Review reported in January 1976 that it had total paid circulation of 2342. Form oppo-
site masthead, 60 MINN. L. REV. (Jan. 1976). The Southern California Law Review re-
ported that it had total paid circulation of 1402 as of October 1, 1975. Form opposite 49 
S. CAL. L. REV. 210 (1975). Both the Minnesota and Southern California law reviews 
were among the top 25 in citation frequency as measured by Maru. Maru, supra note 44, 
at 234. 
For legal academics, of course, these circulation figures are not very important because 
most law school libraries are likely to stock most law reviews. Nevertheless, the substan-
tial differences in circulation must have an effect on citation frequency because of acces-
sibility, even for law professors. A significant number of subscriptions to the Harvard 
Law Review are probably from individual faculty members. Although these people could 
go to their law school libraries to look up material in other reviews, it must be simpler to 
pull this review off their library shelves. Moreover, because they regularly receive their 
own copies, they will be more likely to read something outside their area of concentra-
tion, which partially explains the appearance of citations to Public Law Litigation in 
articles on such a variety of subjects. For those outside the law school world, circulation 
figures translate into basic access considerations; almost everyone can find an issue of the 
Harvard Law Review nearby, but greater effort may be required to obtain many others. 
46. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1976). 
47. Chayes, supra note 25, at 42. 
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lished such nuggets in the venerable Harvard Law Review itself, 
the magnetism becomes almost irresistible. 
No doubt the above factors contributed to the great success of 
the Chayes article, but even legal academe is not so fickle that 
these explanations suffice. Leading professors often publish arti-
cles in the same review, and many of those articles are also ele-
gantly written, but they have not become instant classics. More-
over, others were talking about the same issues, often in 
prominent places and with highly readable prose; thus these su-
perficial distinguishing points do not explain why this article 
outperformed the rest. 
At the same time, the explanation must take account of what 
might be called the substantive enigma-the almost total lack of 
traditional doctrinal analysis in the article. By way of contrast, 
John Dawson's articles on fee awards in public interest litigation 
concentrated on the evolution and oddities of existing doctrine, 
and the peculiar way in which it had developed over a century of 
haphazard expansion.48 Focusing on the same period, Chayes 
paid no attention to such doctrinal development. In his 1982 
Foreword, he did engage in doctrinal analysis, but essentially as 
part of an effort to show that the prevailing analysis did not 
work in several areas because it relied on terms that did not fit 
the reality that courts regularly had to face. Certainly, the expla-
nation for Public Law Litigation's success is not that Chayes of-
fered a great substantive breakthrough that caught on among 
courts or commentators. 
Neither was the absence of substantive content a unique fea-
ture of this article. Others had already· contributed accounts of 
activity out in the trenches. 49 Indeed, one might characterize the 
early 1970's as a time of experimentation with unorthodox law 
review articles that drew their strength from something other 
than their analytical content. 
I suggest that what made this article notable, and still makes 
it important, is the coincidence of three factors: 
(1) The article was not only prominently displayed but timely, 
if not trendy. Although there were rumblings of concern in the 
academy about the issues that Chayes addressed, most of those 
efforts had not yet reached fruition. Within a couple of years, 
both Owen Fiss's book on structural injunctions50 and Donald 
48. See supra note 40. 
49. See, e.g., Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); arti-
cles cited supra note 39. 
50. 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). Indeed, Fiss's casebook on injunc-
tions had already appeared in 1972, and it included a full chapter on structural injunc-
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Horowitz's book on judicial implementation of social policy61 
had appeared; surely neither Fiss nor Horowitz started work af-
ter Chayes's article appeared. Neither would Chayes's work have 
packed such a wallop if these other pieces had been published 
first. 
(2) Readers' immediate reaction to Chayes's article was that 
its description was accurate.· The reason that both Congress and 
other commentators had been concerned with such litigation was 
that there was something worth worrying about. Many readers 
found themselves nodding their heads as they read, probably 
thinking that they wished they had said these insightful things 
first. Indeed, the assent that the article received among judges is 
perhaps the best proof that Chayes's descriptions were accurate 
even though they were based on impressionistic evidence.112 
(3) Chayes offered a framework for analysis. Despite leaving 
us with the substantive enigma, Chayes was very much a lawyer 
as he approached his task. Thus, he broke the problem into cat-
egories and organized the categories in a way that permitted 
others to pursue the problem further. These categories could 
easily be contrasted to Fuller's criteria for effective adjudication, 
thus placing the analysis within a recognized niche in the evolu-
tion of legal theory. 
tions. See 0. F1ss, INJUNCTIONS 415-81 (1972). In the preface to the second edition, Fiss 
explained that "[t]he first edition was a child of the sixties .... Its overriding purpose 
was to bring into the classroom the many remarkable developments that had occurred to 
the injunction in the civil rights area." 0. F1ss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS iii (2d ed. 
1984). 
51. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977). 
52. However one feels about the correctness of Chayes's observations in general, as to 
some matters he was clearly wrong. For a striking example, consider his argument for' 
concluding that suits against governmental officials undoubtedly have widespread effects: 
"Officials will almost inevitably act in accordance with the judicial interpretation in the 
countless similar situations cast up by a sprawling bureaucratic program." Chayes, supra 
note 6, at 1294. Chayes offers no empirical support for this assertion, and one may ques-
tion whether it comports with the experience of lawyers representing persons dealing 
with such bureaucratic organizations as welfare agencies, where compliance with judicial 
decisions may be rather slow. Certainly, Chayes did not reckon with an America in which 
officials like Attorney General Meese suggest that judicial decisions do not actually de-
clare the law, and that they accordingly need not be followed by the bureaucrats. See 
Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REv. 979, 983 (1987). 
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Ill. THE LASTING IMPORTANCE 
Was the article merely a media splash? 113 A sensible way to 
decide is to ask about its lasting impact. As a starting point, it is 
hard to conclude that the article had any significant effect on 
the law. But the article does seem to connect with (although not 
to foresee) the procedural issues that currently have the greatest 
importance. Largely as a consequence, it has contributed to the 
resurgence of academic interest in procedure. 
A. Doctrinal Impact 
For the systematizers of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, doctrinal analysis was the objective of legal schol-
arship, and doctrinal impact was accordingly the measure of suc-
cess. Indeed, over time Wigmore or Williston may well have 
become better authority than the decisions that supposedly pro-
vided the foundation for the assertions they made in their trea-
tises. At least they could point to a multitude of citations adopt-
ing their work and, often, rejecting the contrary views of judges 
in the process. But the efforts of the Wigmores and the Willis-
tons may have been too successful. As order was imposed on the 
chaos of disorganized case law, and previously overlooked legal 
problems diminished in number, so also did the opportunity for 
scholars to have a comparable doctrinal impact decline.64 As a 
result, traditional doctrinal analysis has not recently produced 
many such success stories. The diminished opportunities have 
not prevented people from trying to influence courts, however. 
Failing that, they could excoriate the courts for resisting the bet-
ter way. 
53. Certainly it was not a media splash in the conventional sense. Lest one think that 
no law review article could be, recall the reception of Elman, The Solicitor General's 
Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-60: An Oral History, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987), in which Elman reported that the Justice had ex parte commu-
nications with him about Brown v. Board of Education while the case was pending and 
Elman was, or soon would be, litigating the case on behalf of the government. This arti-
cle did get real media attention. See Taylor, Key 1954 Bias Case: A Drama Backstage, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 5. 
54. This is not to say that doctrinal problems disappeared. While there is no way to 
compare the raw number of problems, it does seem that problems have become more 
difficult, and that today academics cannot bring to the task of doctrinal analysis the kind 
of confidence that their nineteenth-century predecessors felt as they attacked the for-
malism that typified the decisions of that era. 
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By this measure, one would not expect Chayes's article to be 
counted a success because it did not even focus on doctrinal 
analysis. The reader is left to wonder how a judge is to react if 
persuaded by Chayes's arguments. Were there any doubts about 
whether Chayes had reoriented decisions, he seems to have gone 
some distance toward dispelling them himself in his 1982 Fore-
word, where he chronicled the efforts by the Burger Court to 
restrain public law litigation using the model of traditional liti-
gation. These decisions owed little to Chayes's article; none of 
them cites it.66 More to the point, their spirit is surely not sym-
pathetic to the public law litigation model. . 
Had this cutback resulted from Chayes's efforts to call atten-
tion to the tensions of public law litigation, one could see this as 
a doctrinal impact and classify Chayes as another promoter of 
changes who was left to carp about the courts' unwillingness to 
adopt his view. Indeed, the 1982 Foreword has such a sour 
grapes aura to it. Nor has the Court's resistance to Chayes's vi-
sion abated since 1982. In a widely criticized 1983 case, for ex-
ample, it refused to allow a black man who had been injured 
when Los Angeles police officers subjected him to a choke hold 
to sue for an injunction against what he claimed was routine use 
of this dangerous hold, seemingly forbidding equitable relief 
against allegedly illegal police behavior.66 
A similar resistance to what might be seen as a consequence of 
a public law vision of litigation is evident in the Court's 1986 
decision in Diamond v. Charles. 67 In that suit, pro-choice doc-
tors claimed that the 1975 Illinois Abortion Act was unconstitu-
tional. Diamond, also a doctor but an opponent of abortion, was 
allowed to intervene on the defense side to argue the constitu-
tionality of the act. The district court enjoined certain provi-
55. According to Shepards, as of May 1988, the article has never been cited in a 
majority opinion of the Supreme Court, although it has been cited in dissenting opinions. 
If this is discouraging, perhaps some solace can be found in the fact that the Court is 
reportedly citing law review articles less frequently than it did in the past. See Sirico & 
Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 131, 134 (1986). 
56. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). The majority held that the 
plaintiff not only did not have standing to sue for the injunction, but that he •would also 
be unable to satisfy the traditional limitations on the availability of injunctive relief. 
Even though he could sue for damages, the plaintiff could not show he was likely to be 
subjected to the hold again, "a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all 
citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are 
unconstitutional." Id. at 111. For a stinging criticism of this decision, see Fallon, supra 
note 30. For related arguments, see Chayes's criticism of Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 
(1976), in Chayes, supra note 6, at 1305-07. 
57. 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
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sions of the act on the ground that they were unconstitutional, 
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the state did not ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, Diamond tried to do so. The state 
accommodatingly filed a letter of interest endorsing Diamond's 
arguments as "essentially co-terminous" with the state's posi-
tion.118 Even though, as an intervenor, Diamond had the full 
right to litigate in the lower courts, the Court dismissed the ap-
peal because, absent the state's active participation, there was 
no case or controversy sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction. 
In the process, it held that Diamond had not suffered injury in 
fact despite his arguments that, as a pediatrician, he would gain 
patients if the abortion requirements were tightened. This ruling 
seems in keeping with the traditional view that private citizens 
do not have the right to seek judicial assistance in compelling 
enforcement of the criminal law. 
From a procedural standpoint, the more interesting issue was 
whether the fact that Diamond had already participated in the 
litigation as an intervenor should make a difference. On this 
point, the Court showed some ambivalence. Though acknowledg-
ing that intervenors are usually considered full parties and 
therefore entitled to appeal, the Court held that they had to sat-
isfy Article Ill requirements independently to appeal in the ab-
sence of the party on whose side they intervened. The Court de-
clined, however, to decide whether a party seeking to intervene 
must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a), dealing 
with intervention of right, but also Article Ill, noting only that 
"the precise relationship between the interest required to satisfy 
the Rule and the interest required to confer standing, has led to 
anomalous decisions in the Courts of Appeals."119 This problem 
was highlighted by Chayes in his article and presents one of the 
most perplexing aspects of adapting conventional notions of liti-
gation to the extended effects of decisions. 60 
A good illustration of the intervention problem, and of the 
kind of innovative view of participation in litigation that seems 
tempting in public law litigation, is presented by the 1972 deci-
sion in United States v. Reserve Mining Co.61 by District Judge 
Miles Lord. After the United States sued to prevent defendant 
mining company from continuing to dump a byproduct of its op-
eration into Lake Superior on the ground that such dumping vi-
58. Id. at 61. 
59. Id. at 68. 
60. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1289-92 (exploring the problems with confining in-
tervention after the "demise of the bipolar structure"). 
61. 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972). 
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olated the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Refuse Act, 
there were suggestions that, even if alternative methods of dis-
posing of the material could be found, they might be so expen-
sive that the company would shut down its operations rather 
than comply. This prospect prompted more than a dozen re-
quests to intervene. Most of these were on the defense side by 
local governmental organizations and civic organizations worried 
about the economic effect on the region of a shutdown of the 
defendant's plant. As to these intervenors, it could not be said 
that they had any "right" to litigate at all. Environmental 
groups and others, meanwhile, sought to intervene as plaintiffs; 
it was unclear whether they could have sued Reserve Mining in-
dependently had the government not chosen to sue. 
Judge Lord decided to allow all the intervenors into the case, 
stressing provisions of the Water Pollution Control Act that di-
rect the court to fashion a decree with "due consideration to the 
practicability and to the physical and economic feasibility of 
complying with such standards."62 Given this invitation to con-
sider the impact on the local economy, the judge decided that 
the intervention net could be cast widely. Strikingly anticipating 
what Chayes said four years later in the Public Law Litigation 
article, the judge explained: 
The role of a court in such a situation, because of the 
nature of the proceedings and considerations which must 
be reviewed and undertaken pursuant to the statute, 
transcends ordinary civil litigation and makes a reviewing 
court more of an administrative tribunal than a court in 
an ordinary adversary civil case. 63 
Thus, the basic thrust is a democratic one-before it enters a 
decree that will affect a large number of people, the court should 
allow them to be heard.6" ·obviously, Judge Lord did not need 
Chayes's yet-unwritten article to develop this concept. Tying 
that attitude to the requirements of the pollution statute may 
have been a political measure by the judge; it is hardly true that 
such considerations of impact on others are irrelevant to tradi-
62. Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 413 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (omitted as 
superseded by Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972))). 
63. Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 413. 
64. This democratic thrust was substantially eroded by the judge's simultaneous im-
position of a variety of restrictions on the intervenors' freedom of action. See id. at 420 
(requiring intervenors and current parties to cooperate and act together in most phases 
of case); cf. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct. 1177 (1987) (up-
holding such limitations). 
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tional criteria for fashioning injunctions.65 Moreover, this atti-
tude sets little store by questions of legal interest; none of the 
intervenors on the defense side had a legal right to insist that 
defendant go on operating and polluting in the area, and the 
plaintiff intervenors may have had no independent right to sue 
challenging the defendant's dumping activities. Rather, it is a 
pragmatic and sensitive adjustment of a long-standing proce-
dural device to the problems presented by new forms of 
litigation. 
Does the Supreme Court want to put a stop to this kind of 
thing? Its ambivalence in Diamond u. Charles66 makes the an-
swer unclear. Some of the Court's post-1976 decisions show a 
more receptive attitude toward adapting traditional molds to 
achieve regulatory objectives but also show the strain of trying 
to do so in the traditional way. Consider, for example, the trick 
solution the Court used to solve the problem presented when a 
class representative's individual claim became moot after trial 
court denial of class status, but before appellate review of that 
decision. In Deposit Guaranty National Bank u. Roper,67 after 
the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify a class in 
an action charging usurious interest, the defendant bank ten-
dered to them the maximum amounts that they could recover on 
their individual claims, $889 and $423 respectively. Because they 
sought to represent a class composed of 90,000 credit card hold-
ers, the plaintiffs rejected this offer, but the district court en-
tered judgment in their favor for these amounts anyway. The 
plaintiffs appealed, contending that they should have been al-
lowed to prosecute the case as a class action, and the Court held 
that they still had a sufficient interest in the litigation to con-
tinue to litigate this issue. Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Burger extolled the virtues of class actions as devices to deal 
with "injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of govern-
ment."68 Despite these benefits, he insisted that the plaintiffs' 
right to continue pursuing class certification depended on their 
interest in the "procedural" right, which he explained was "an-
cillary to the litigation of substantive claims."69 In a footnote, 
65. See e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (refusing injunction requiring cement plant to cease emissions that 
constituted a nuisance because injunction would result in closing of plant in which de-
fendant had very large investment and in which over 300 people were employed). 
66. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
67. 445 U.S. 326 (1980). 
68. Id. at 339. 
69. Id. at 332. 
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the opinion suggested that the plaintiffs' critical stake was to 
spread their litigation costs, which would be possible only if 
their claims were aggregated with those of other credit card 
holders.70 More realistically, the stake was the lawyer's71 and, 
derivatively, society's. The opposite ruling would invite efforts 
by defendants in the position of the bank to "buy off'' small 
claims, thereby nullifying the utility of the class action as a de-
vice for enforcing the societal norms reflected in usury laws and 
the Truth in Lending Act. In a companion case, the Court did 
not even try to justify the "procedural claim" sleight of hand on 
cost-sharing grounds. 72 Instead, it explained blandly that this 
fiction was necessary to "achieve the primary benefits of class 
suits" and therefore "more analogous to the private attorney 
general concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought 
to satisfy the 'personal stake' requirement. "73 
At this point, it should be clear that the Court itself is not 
averse to reaching anomalous results to deal with the felt neces-
sities of public law litigation; as Chayes pointed. out in 1982, 
even an unsympathetic Court must sometimes play the game by 
the new rules. But that is hardly because of the scholarly work 
of Chayes or anybody else; the problems existed before the 
scholars began to describe them. Hence the most that can be 
said regarding the impact of the article at the highest reaches of 
the American judiciary is that it has identified a set of problems 
that the Court prefers to resist but cannot overcome. 
Perhaps a greater doctrinal impact might be expected among 
the lower courts, but it is hard to say that has happened. As 
Jµdge Lord's innovative attitudes in Reserve Mining demon-
strate, some judges did not need an academic invitation to ex-
periment with new attitudes. But the sort of flexibility he dis-
played was not universal. Indeed, it may even have been 
considered inappropriate at the time. It is worth noting that the 
70. Id. at 338 n.9. 
71. Thus, it is difficult to understand why the plaintiffs themselves would ·have felt 
slighted by the offer made by defendant, which gave them everything they individually 
could have obtained had they won the suit. Counsel, however, was presumably unwilling 
to take attorneys' fees out of such a small sum and eager to generate a common fund 
from which to claim a much larger fee using the doctrine examined by Professor Dawson. 
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Unless the plaintiffs would have to pay more 
in fees should class status ultimately be denied, it is hard to understand how they per-
sonally had any stake in the class certification issue. To the contrary, their personal 
interests might be compromised by class treatment because they would need court ap-
proval to settle their claims. See FEo. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
72. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). 
73. Id. at 403. For Chayes's own evaluation of this reasoning, see Chayes, supra note 
25, at 43-45. 
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Eighth Circuit later removed Judge Lord from the Reserve Min-
ing case on the ground that other· rulings he had made showed 
that his involvement in the situation had undermined his judi-
cial impartiality.'" 
Since Chayes's article appeared, it does not seem that other 
judges have rushed to embrace Judge Lord's attitude.76 For ex-
ample, consider the reactions of Judge Justice of the Eastern 
District of Texas, himself no stranger to structural litigation as 
the judge who presided over the massive suit restructuring the 
Texas Department of Corrections.76 In a class action challenging 
conditions at Texas institutions for the mentally retarded, he 
was presented with a request for intervention on the defendants' 
side by a parents group concerned that the state might react to 
the judge's decree by closing the affected institutions. After 
quoting from Chayes's "now famous law review article,"" the 
judge refused to allow intervention for reasons that indicate 
great skepticism about undue relaxation of traditional rules in 
such litigation: 
Class action injunctive suits seeking institutional re-
form-the so called "public law litigation" or "structural 
reform" suits-tend to draw in intervenor-applicants in 
an ever-widening, self-destructive whirlpool. Courts must 
exercise control over the lawsuit to keep it manageable 
while ensuring that all legally cognizable interests are 
represented and protected. 78 
Even knowledgeable and sympathetic judges, then, may shy 
away from embracing some implications of Chayes's work.79 
74. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). 
75. This is not to say that the lower courts share the Supreme Court's attitudes. For 
example, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (discussed supra note 56) is 
said to have "at best a grudging following in the lower courts," which sometimes resort to 
"transparent evasions." Schuwerk, Future Class Actions, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 92-93 
(1987). Moreover, courts have taken speculative academic work like that of Chayes quite 
seriously. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523, 1537-38 (10th Cir. 1983) (embrac-
ing Professor Fiss's analysis). 
76. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), atf'd in part and rev'd in 
part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.), amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
77. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 98 F.R.D. 11, 22 (E.D. Tex. 1982). 
78. Id. at 21-22. 
79. Judge Justice did say that the objecting parents had sufficient representation be-
cause he allowed them to file amicus curiae briefs. Id. at 22-23. But that opportunity is 
surely much short of being allowed to participate as an intervenor. On the other hand, 
Judge Lord, with his open-handed view of intervention, substantially curtailed the inter-
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Of course, we cannot be sure what Chayes would have pre-
scribed for Judge Justice's case. In large measure, the absence of 
doctrinal impact is a result of Chayes's failure to provide a doc-
trinal prescription. It is hard to say what the new rule should be 
among judges who do embrace his vision. It is fine to say, as 
Chayes did, that the traditional preoccupation in standing law 
with injury in fact and legal interest should be supplanted in 
public law cases with a focus on the "fundamental issue," the 
question of representation. so But that tells us little about how to 
assess the concerns that the concept of legal interest addressed 
by limiting the number of people who could bring matters into 
court.81 Judge Lord, for example, seemed unconcerned that the 
intervening municipal organizations had no legal interest in Re-
serve Mining's pollution of Lake Superior, or the resulting em-
ployment for residents of the area. Judge Justice, in contrast, 
seemed comforted by the idea that the intervenors in his case 
venors' freedom of action by requiring each side to act collectively. See United States v. 
Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 420 (D. Minn. 1972). 
80. See Chayes, supra note 25, at 44 ("The verbal gymnastics in many of these cases 
would not have been necessary, however, if the Court had focused on the fundamental 
issue of representation."). In his Public Law Litigation article, Chayes spent several 
pages on the problem of representation, mainly reacting to the points made in an earlier 
article by his colleague Professor Richard Stewart, who had suggested that such 
problems might be handled using existing procedural tools. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 
1310-13. He closed by acknowledging that his views were "fragmentary and impressionis-
tic," and admitting to uneasiness about the sorts of issues that Judge Justice cited: "A 
critical question for research is whether this potential is or can be exploited to produce a 
party structure that is adequately representative in light of the consequences of public 
law litigation without introducing so much complexity that the procedure falls of its own 
weight." Id. at 1312. Chayes did not explain how this research should be done. For an 
example of creative efforts actually to analyze such problems, see Brunet, A Study in the 
Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Crite-
ria, 12 GA. L. REv. 701 (1978) (using economic analysis to evaluate the utility of addi-
tional participation in litigation). 
By the time he wrote the Foreword, Chayes felt that the problem of representation 
could be factored into standing law, and that "[f]ocus on the representational issues 
would not necessarily lead to unqualified acceptance of the public action and subversion 
of all limits on standing." Chayes, supra note 25, at 25. His proposed limiting factors, 
however, hardly seem to provide useful guidance. See id. at 25-26; cf. id. at 36-37 (pro-
posed approach to class certification "unlikely to generate dispositive criteria"). Thus, 
Chayes never articulated a new test he viewed as workable, which may be symptomatic 
of the kinds of disappointments that lead modern doctrinal analysts to despair and to 
speak of a malaise in legal scholarship. See infra note 81. 
81. Chayes felt that the framers of the Federal Rules had also punted on this one: 
[I]f the right to participate in litigation is no longer determined by one's claim to 
relief at the hands of another party or one's potential liability to satisfy the 
claim, it becomes hard to draw the line determining those who may participate 
so as to eliminate anyone who is or might be significantly (a weasel word) af-
fected by the outcome-and the latest revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure has more or less abandoned the attempt. 
Chayes, supra note 6, at 1290. 
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had no legal right in the continued operation of illegal facilities 
for the mentally retarded. Besides endorsing the idea of consid-
ering other interests, as Judge Justice did, Chayes did not pro-
pose a workable substitute for the legal interest idea. 
With regard to initiating litigation, some qualitative assess-
ment of interests is quite inviting. If all affected individuals pre-
fer the existing regime, courts should be reluctant to upset it at 
the behest of an outsider. In those circumstances, the courts 
may refuse the outsider's request by invoking the generally ac-
cepted proposition that, without more, plaintiffs generally have 
no abstract right to petition the courts to enforce the law. What 
Judge Lord and Judge Justice confronted, however, was a 
slightly different problem: Once a proper plaintiff has invoked 
the court's aid, particularly for equitable relief, should the court 
entertain the views of others who may be affected by its decree? 
One might be inclined to relax the quality of interest analysis in 
that situation on the theory that it is in the nature of equitable 
discretion to consider the impact on others. Hence the unwill-
ingness of the Court in Diamond v. Charles to insist that inter-
venors demonstrate standing.82 The Court's ambivalence in Dia-
mond might be a signal that a forceful new thesis could carry 
the day. But Chayes left the central question unanswered. Iden-
tifying the problem is useful, but saying only that it is a problem 
of representation is not. Chayes did not provide the key to the 
problem, and this failure limited the doctrinal impact of the 
article. 
A different reason for the lack of doctrinal impact is hinted at 
in the 1982 Foreword: the frequency and importance of public 
law litigation, as Chayes described it, began to decline in the 
1970's. In Chayes's terms, then, one would expect the issues he 
discussed to become less important as well; perhaps the concept 
of public law litigation was not useful. Nevertheless, the central 
concerns raised by Chayes remain important. 
B. Treating Public Law Litigation Differently: The Link 
Between Chayes and Current Issues 
Chayes's starting point was that public law litigation was sig-
nificantly different from other litigation, and his article was cer-
tainly taken to refer principally to the new breed of litigation 
that resulted from judicial activism in the wake of Brown v. 
82. 476 U.S. 54 (1986); see supra text accompanying note 59. 
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Board of Education II. 83 Yet his article is more circumspect on 
this point. Besides tracing the shift away from the classical 
model of litigation back to 1875, certainly a time when there 
were few school desegregation suits, Cha yes included different 
sorts of cases in his general description of the new litiga-
tion-"[a]ntitrust, securities fraud and other aspects of the con-
duct of corporate business, bankruptcy and reorganizations, 
union governance, consumer fraud, housing discrimination, elec-
toral reapportionment, environmental management."8" This ex-
pansive view has merit because successful monopolization suits 
or suits to undo illegal mergers make courts fashion decrees 
whose provisions do not flow obviously from the finding of a vio-
lation. Often such decrees can involve judicial supervision over 
years, even decades. 811 Moreover, as Professors Eisenberg and 
Yeazell pointed out in their 1980 article challenging Chayes,86 
one can find somewhat analogous exercises of equitable judicial 
power centuries ago in English litigation. 
Without conceding any of this, in his 1982 Foreword Chayes 
backtracked on his earlier emphasis on the nature of the decree 
as central to the public law aspect of litigation, arguing that the 
distinguishing features of the sort of litigation that interested 
83. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (directing that school desegregation proceed "with all 
deliberate speed"). 
84. Chayes, supra note 6, at 1284. 
85. Perhaps the leading example is the odyssey of the meatpacker decree. In Febru-
ary 1920, the United States sued the five leading meatpackers, charging them with mo-
nopolization. The defendants consented to entry of a decree forbidding them from en-
gaging in certain practices. Beginning nine years later, the defendants tried to convince 
the court to change these provisions in light of changed circumstances. See United States 
v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). This initial effort to undo the decree was unsuccess-
ful; the decree was not dismantled until the 1980's. See D. LAYCOCK, supra note 36, at 
1029-35. 
More recently, the prime example has been the ongoing supervision of telephone com-
panies by Judge Greene pursuant to the consent decree in the government's suit to break 
up AT&T. One congressman has challenged Greene's decisions as a "fundamentally anti-
democratic process whereby a single unelected, unaccountable federal judge has trans-
formed himself into a regulator without portfolio." Sontag, No Easy Answers In the 
AT&T Case, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 36. col. 3. The judge's efforts have also provoked 
the Federal Communications Commission, whose chairman resorted to what the judge 
described as "the unusual, if not unprecedented step ... of exhorting those whom the 
agency regulates to refuse to comply with orders duly issued by this Court." United 
States v. Western Elec. Co., 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 67,783, at 59,221 (D.D.C. 1987). 
Invoking images of the heroic federal judges who pressed forward with integration de-
spite widespread resistance in the South, id. at 59,222 n.24, the judge resolved to con-
tinue his enforcement of the decree. 
86. Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Liti-
gation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 466 (1980) ("[M]uch of what other commentators see as 
confined to institutional litigation is present, although in somewhat disguised forms, in 
all litigation."). 
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him were "the nature of the controversy, the sources of the gov-
erning law, and the consequent extended impact of the deci-
sion."87 Little as this explains, it does show that Chayes was 
finding it more difficult than originally appreciated to decide 
what was and what was not public law litigation. 
Given the decline in structural civil rights litigation-which 
Chayes recognized88-the 1982 recalibration seems unwarranted 
if it was designed to limit the focus to such cases. There is a real 
problem in deciding what public law is, popular though the con-
cept may be. At one extreme, it would seem that enforcement of 
contracts is distinctly private in the sense that the courts are 
simply implementing private arrangements made by the parties. 
But even those cases involve an overlay of legal rules imposed by 
society.89 True, one may consider various constitutional protec-
tions more important or valuable than laws against usury, but a 
regulatory tenor pervades civil litigation as a private substitute 
for public enforcement. In this atmosphere, the private/public 
dichotomy becomes extremely difficult to apply.90 Is "public law 
litigation," for example, different from "public interest litiga-
tion"? Do Chayes's revised guidelines provide a meaningful 
focus? 
One view is that all legal rules reflect public values.91 Due to 
the increasingly regulatory tinge to much American "private" 
law, there is a public interest in litigation outcomes. Recall Chief 
Justice Burger's explanation for his benign view of class actions 
in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper-that they should 
be available when the government's regulatory efforts fail.92 
Moreover, it is becoming apparent that there is a significant 
public interest in all civil litigation; because litigation is sup-
87. Chayes, supra note 25, at 58. 
88. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
89. Putting aside such limitations on the mythical freedom of contract as laws 
against usury, courts will occasionally revise the terms of contracts to adjust them to 
unexpected and calamitous developments. See generally Hillman, Court Adjustment of 
Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1. 
90. Indeed, the dichotomy may be breaking down as a general matter. See generally 
A Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). 
91. See Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1979) (stat-
ing that "all rights enforced by courts are public"). 
92. 445 U.S. 326 (1980); see supra text accompanying note 68. This private enforce-
ment approach has some appeal: "[L]egislatures or courts make law, but leave it to citi-
zens to enforce. We have effectively 'privatized' litigation by delegating the task of en-
forcement to those holding the greatest incentive and amount of information regarding a 
dispute, the private litigants." Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute 
Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1987). 
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ported by public funds and uses public officials, the public has 
an interest in how this public facility is performing.93 
The enduring significance of what Chayes described, there-
fore, should not and cannot be limited to some small class of 
"public law" cases, however defined. Even as these are in de-
cline, the themes identified by Chayes remain with us. Although 
he focused on what may prove to be a transitory phenomenon in 
our legal culture, he actually posed the questions that must be 
addressed in connection with litigation in general. · 
In this section, I will explore this conclusion by examining the 
three most controversial subjects in litigation at present. First, 
the growing concern with the tort "crisis" shows how hard it is 
to segregate public law litigation as an area of special impor-
tance. Instead, the reaction to this new preoccupation ties in 
with my other two subjects-managerial judging, and the grow-
ing disaffection with adjudication that has spawned the alterna-
tive dispute resolution movement-and with Chayes's probing. 
Accordingly, it seems that, although he focused on a phenome-
non of waning importance, Chayes somewhat unwittingly 
pointed out the issues that continue to be important. 
1. The tort "crisis"- Personal injury litigation seems to dis-
play few of the features that Chayes found peculiar to public law 
litigation. The legal rules have evolved over time, but they cer-
tainly look different from the high-toned constitutional princi-
ples that typify the school desegregation or prison conditions 
suit. The relief seems to be prototypically private-a single 
transfer of money from defendant to plaintiff if plaintiff wins. 
But tort law has changed. The nineteenth-century individual-
ism that supported doctrines like the fellow-servant rule and 
made contributory negligence a complete defense has yielded to 
a different attitude that views tort remedies as ways to shift the 
costs of accidents. More significantly, products liability, scarcely 
an important part of the docket fifty years ago, has emerged as 
the major focus of innovation in tort law. Path-breaking scholars 
and courts have propelled plaintiffs into new theories not solely 
to improve the plaintiffs' chances of compensation, but also and 
explicitly to alter the behavior of providers of goods and ser-
vices. 94 Thus courts are increasingly willing to entertain the idea 
93. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (hold-
ing that public has right to attend preliminary hearing in criminal case to observe per-
formance of judge). 
94. E.g., Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the In-
tellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985) (chroni-
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of punitive damages in products liability cases, explicitly endors-
ing relief designed to alter conduct. 
These developments have, not surprisingly, provoked spirited 
opposition. The insurance industry, in particular, has regularly 
complained that shifts in the law have undermined its ability to 
make the calculations necessary to set premium levels. 96 A few 
notable bankruptcies resulting from massive tort litigation (e.g., 
Manville Corp. and A.H. Robins) seem to lend substance to ar-
guments that tort liability has gotten out of hand. Even the in-
strumental argument has been turned on its head by those who 
assert that regulation through jury verdicts is stifling innovation 
in technology.96 It is harder to say now than it was in 1976 that 
"conventional" tort litigation has only private significance; in 
terms of social importance, it may rival the sort of cases Chayes 
had in mind. 
Moreover, at least some tort cases display characteristics very 
similar to those Chayes identified in public law litigation. Con-
sider, for example, Smith v. Western Electric Co.,97 a Missouri 
state court case. The plaintiff, Mr. Smith, suffered increasingly 
severe reactions to his fellow workers' smoke in the workplace, 
including nausea, dizziness, blackouts, loss of memory, and cold 
sweats. When Mr. Smith's employer, the defendant, refused to 
alter its rules on smoking to protect him, Smith sued, claiming 
that the defendant had breached its duty to use all reasonable 
care to provide a safe workplace. 
At first blush, this looks like a standard tort suit. The twist 
was that the plaintiff did not sue for damages, perhaps because 
his injuries had not yet reached the point where they would be 
considered compensable, or perhaps because under applicable 
workers liability legislation, he could not sue his employer but 
only could seek benefits through an administrative scheme. In-
stead, Smith sued for an injunction requiring his employer to 
protect him against exposure to smoke. After the trial court dis-
missed the case for failure to state a claim for relief, the appel-
late court reversed, reasoning that compensatory damages were 
cling "conceptual revolution" in tort law with dimensions "comparable only with those of 
Realism and Brown v. Board of Education"). 
95. For an examination of these arguments, see Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis 
and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987). 
96. See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Manage-
ment, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985) (arguing that the tort system is antagonistic toward 
new technology and therefore stifles innovation). 
97. 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
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inadequate, and particularly so where "the harm has not yet re-
sulted in full-blown disease or injury."98 
The court's reasoning has a great deal of appeal. Even Judge 
Posner recognizes that compensatory damages are an inadequate 
substitute for avoiding the harm altogether.99 Not only does this 
recognition fit the traditional inadequacy of legal relief prerequi-
site for equitable remedies, it also makes an injunction an ex-
tremely attractive judicial reaction to the specter of personal in-
juries. Subjecting people to personal injuries is hard to justify if 
an injunction could prevent the injuries. 
To accept that reasoning, however, immerses the court in 
most of the problems that Chayes felt were peculiar to public 
law litigation. Although the plaintiff had a particularly violent 
reaction to smoke in the workplace, such exposure harms many, 
as Smith alleged in his complaint. 100 Like the plaintiff in a pub-
lic law case, then, Smith had drawn the court's attention to an 
evil and asked the court to rectify it. 101 Indeed, given the current 
concern with toxins in the workplace, one might well suggest 
that the court should not stop with cigarette smoke but also in-
vestigate other possibly dangerous substances in the defendant's 
plant. The tightly constructed traditional lawsuit seems far 
behind. 
The relief problem in Smith is also similar to the public law 
model. Particularly if it tries to eliminate the possible harm to 
other nonsmokers, the court has no legal guidance on what it 
should decree to solve the problem. The court could forbid 
smoking in the plant. Before doing that, however, it should con-
sider representation for the workers at the plant who smoke. An-
other possibility is to establish (and monitor) rules for smoking 
in the plant, although there is no legally obvious model for such 
rules. 102 Moreover, particularly if the court broadens its atten-
98. Id. at 13. 
99. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 189 (3d ed. 1986) ("[T]he tendency of 
tort damages, although so often criticized as excessive, is in fact to undercompensate the 
victims of serious accidents. If damages compensated the victim fully, he would be indif-
ferent between being injured or not being injured."). 
100. See Smith, 643 S.W.2d at 12 ("The petition further states that, although 'sec-
ond-hand smoke' is harmful to the health of all employees, defendant is permitting them 
to be exposed in the workplace to this health hazard .... "). 
101. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1297 ("Attention is drawn to a 'mischief,' existing 
or threatened, and the activity of the parties and the court is directed to the develop-
ment of on-going measures designed to cure that mischief."). 
102. By way of illustration, in Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 
516, 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), the court ordered the employer "to 
provide safe working conditions for plaintiff by restricting the smoking of employees to 
the nonwork area presently used as a lunchroom." Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416. In Smith 
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tion to include consideration of other dangerous substances in 
the workplace, there will be a prospective fact-finding problem: 
How much protection is enough? 
Even at the level of enforcement, there are analogies to the 
public law model. In the public law cases, many have pointed 
out the limitations on the court's ability to force public officials 
to spend money they do not have as a result of hard fiscal 
times.103 As we have seen, similar concerns animated requests 
for intervention in United States v. Reserve Mining Co. 104 Lock-
ing up the officials seems unproductive and unlikely to solve the 
fiscal problems. Smith does not present such problems so long as 
the court confines its attention to cigarette smoke, as opposed to 
other toxic substances, but recalcitrant smokers might frustrate 
many measures. Should the court put them in jail for disobeying 
the new smoking rules? Even if it has the power to do so, 105 the 
court would have to monitor and enforce an ongoing regime of 
compliance much like a court in a school desegregation case. 
Undeniably, there are differences between classically private 
law litigation and public law litigation. One way to distinguish 
them is to make a qualitative judgment in favor.of constitutional 
values and against more mundane concerns. But that approach 
becomes more difficult to justify when serious personal injuries 
or threats to health are at issue. Most personal injury litigation 
has not developed the characteristics that make Smith v. West-
ern Electric Co. so troubling, however; usually the court sys-
tem's approach to personal injuries will be to dole out inade-
itself, defendant argued that the state law tort action was preempted by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act (OSHA), but the court rejected this argument, noting that 
there was no applicable OSHA standard covering tobacco smoke. See Smith v. Western 
Elec. Co., 643 S.W. 2d 10, 13-14 (Mo. Ct. App 1982). Certainly, one may make legitimate 
arguments that such standards are more properly designed by regulatory bodies like the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (established pursuant to OSHA) 
than by courts. The point here is that, given the rather abstract goal of a safe workplace, 
the court is without legal direction in framing a decree, just as the court seeking to rec-
tify unconstitutional conditions at a prison is left to its own resources in framing relief. 
103. See, e.g., Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978). 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63. 
105. As employees of defendant, these smokers might be subject to contempt for vio-
lation of the decree. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) (injunction binding on "officers, servants, 
employees, and attorneys" of a party enjoined). To this it could be argued that the 
smokers' smoking was not in the course of their employment, and was therefore beyond 
the reach of an injunction. But there is at least some authority for enjoining nonparties 
who have the ability to disrupt implementation of the court's decree. See United States 
v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding nonparty in contempt of order from court 
supervising integration of school that forbade anyone except teachers and students to go 
on school grounds where outsiders had previously disrupted integration process); Note, 
Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. REV. 719 (1965). 
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quate compensation rather than to try to prevent injuries with 
an injunctive regime. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to view public law litigation as hermetically sealed from 
other litigation, even conventional tort litigation. Instead, the 
growing judicial consensus seems to be that most, or all, litiga-
tion should be treated as imbued with public interest. That, in 
turn, leads judges presiding over all types of litigation to engage 
in what Chayes observed in public law litigation-managerial 
judging. 
2. Managerial judging- There can be little doubt that 
Chayes was correct in perceiving a great shift in judicial behav-
ior from the classical model in which the judge was a passive 
arbiter. He saw this change as resulting from the judge's need to 
fashion a remedy for unconstitutional conditions, a development 
that made the judge step in and take over matters that formerly 
would have been left to the parties. Active judicial involvement, 
then, was a response to necessity. 
In retrospect, it seems that Chayes perceived the necessity 
and the response too narrowly. The features of public law litiga-
tion that prompted judicial efforts to control litigation cannot 
meaningfully be limited to that kind of litigation. As might have 
been expected, judges promptly applied the lessons they had 
learned from their public law litigation experiences outside that 
realm. Having found a significant public interest in most civil 
litigation, judges reacted by taking charge of ordinary cases in a 
way somewhat similar to that in which they had taken control of 
the cases Chayes described. As Professor Subrin has recently re-
minded us, equity conquered law in the framing of the federal 
rules,106 and Chayes properly described what he saw as the "tri-
umph of equity."107 What Chayes did not appreciate was the 
pervasiveness of this triumph.108 
Beginning at about the time that Chayes was writing, district 
judges in a number of metropolitan districts began expanding 
106. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
107. Chayes, supra note 6, at 1292. In his footnotes, Chayes paid homage to the role 
of equity rules in American procedural reform. See id. at 1283 n.11 ("[I]t was essentially 
the equitable procedure that was adopted in the reforming codes of the last half of the 
nineteenth century."). But Chayes did not follow through on the insight; the core issue 
(which is implicitly raised by Chayes's work) is the expansion of trial court power that 
results from the adoption of the equity model for rules. 
108. On these points I am indebted to Steve Burbank. See Burbank, The Costs of 
Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1469-76, 1478-80 (1987); see also Sub-
rin, supra note 106, at 913 (stating that Chayes's article "does not do justice to the 
revolutionary character of the decision inherent in the Federal Rules to make equity 
procedure available for all cases"). 
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their role in the pretrial preparation of most civil litigation 
through status conferences and similar devices designed to en-
able the judge to influence the development of all cases.109 Find-
ing this experience helpful in disposing of cases, these innovative 
judges soon began to proselytize for their more active role in liti-
gation. These efforts bore fruit in the 1983 amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which promote such activity 
by all judges. Thus, since 1983, judges have been required to set 
deadlines in all civil cases for the completion of discovery and 
related matters and encouraged to involve themselves in all 
phases of all lawsuits. 110 
Although Chayes apparently did not foresee this development, 
it flows from the triumph of equity and raises many of the same 
concerns he voiced in his article. As a result, the Public Law 
Litigation article is a starting point in assessing and criticizing 
the growth of managerial judging.m Specifically, managerial 
judging involves a relaxation of forms that usually attend the 
interaction between the judge and the lawyers in connection 
with civil litigation. In this sense, it flows from the relaxed tradi-
tion of equity as compared with the rigidity of the common law. 
That rigidity might have appealed to Fuller, whose vision of liti-
gation assumed a trial judge tightly constrained by the litigation 
choices of the parties, on the one hand, and the close scrutiny of 
appellate courts, on the other.112 As Professor Subrin has re-
cently reminded us, there are costs associated with abandoning 
that rigid structure. 
To illustrate: while the judge might well become involved in 
litigation before trial in the classical model, that would usually 
be in response to motions made by the parties. The motion pro-
cess itself imposed constraints on the judge's involvement. The 
moving party would first have to make the motion, usually sup-
ported by written reasons, and the opponent would ordinarily be 
given a chance to respond in writing, with a reply by the propo-
nent often permitted. Only then would the judge become in-
volved, and then customarily only to resolve the disputed issues 
109. For a description of the way in which judges were handling such matters in the 
mid to late 1970's, see Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role 
in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981). 
110. See generally Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact 
of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 
363 (1983). It should perhaps be noted that courts may, by rule, exempt certain specified 
classes of cases from this requirement. 
111. The leading example of such an assessment is Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. 
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raised by the parties. Indeed, so legalistic was this process that 
judges often took to dispensing with oral hearings on such mo-
tions and deciding them on the papers.113 This pretrial role con-
formed to the classical model of judging because the judge was 
to apply legal principles to the issues framed by the parties in 
adversary give-and-take. 
In the era of managerial judging, many of these forms have 
been discarded for much of the judge's pretrial activity. Instead 
of awaiting the parties' motions, the judge takes the initiative 
and schedules a status conference at which the parties are likely 
to be called upon to announce their intention to make motions. 
The judge will then schedule the motions along with the other 
matters covered by the initial pretrial order. The judge will 
often schedule further pretrial conferences to monitor the pro-
gress being made in preparing for trial. More significantly, 
judges are often inclined to bypass the traditional motion proce-
dure and make on the spot decisions regarding issues that would 
otherwise be presented by motion. 114 Although this practice can 
be seen as cutting through red tape and delay, it also materially 
alters the dynamics of the pretrial decision-making process. The 
advocate who does not have notice that a certain matter will be 
raised at a status conference often fails, when confronted by the 
judge's questions, to make all the arguments that might occur 
with the reflection afforded by the motion process. And nothing 
limits such sessions to the minutiae of discovery, as the rules 
invite the judge to use such conferences to decide whether 
claims or def ens es are groundless. Some judges take this as an 
opportunity to pressure lawyers to drop claims they perceive as 
wrong on the facts. 1111 
113. A number of federal district courts have local rules directing that motions usu-
ally be decided without oral argument. See e.g., S.D. FLA. R. 10B; N.D. GA. R. 220(c); D. 
IDAHO R. 2-109; D. KAN. R. 206(d). 
114. Thus, Judge Peckham explains that "[t]he informal outline of the issues at the 
outset of the status conference also helps the parties focus on possible grounds for dis-
missal or summary judgment." Peckham, supra note 109, at 780. 
115. For example, consider Judge Peckham's attitude in United Food & Commercial 
Workers Local No. 115 v. Armour & Co., 106 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The suit al-
leged that defendant had refused to arbitrate, but it had not. After conducting discovery, 
defendant was therefore successful on its motion for summary judgment. It then sought 
sanctions against the plaintiff's counsel under FED. R. Crv. P. 11. While finding that sanc0 
tions were appropriate because there was no basis in fact for the suit, Judge Peckham 
allowed only a portion of defendant's legal expenses because its lawyers had not called 
his attention to the factual baselessness of the suit before embarking on discovery. He 
reasoned that this failure to involve him was in essence a failure to mitigate: 
Once Armour had pointed out, in the presence of the court, that it had agreed to 
arbitrate, it seems likely that Union's counsel would have had to acknowledge 
his failure to investigate and would have dropped the suit. And if Union's coun-
678 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:4 
The obvious result of this protean role for the judge is to ex-
pand the judge's control over the development of the case, some-
times including responsibility for the proper preparation of the 
case.116 On a much broader scale than Chayes realized, then, 
modern judging raises problems of legitimacy of the investigat-
ing magistrate when measured against the classical model. Ad 
hoc judicial activity is hard to square with the notion that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied in the same 
manner in all cases; the triumph of equity now seems to mean 
that the rules are merely guideposts. As a result, there is a 
troubling possibility that judges may indulge their own prefer-
ences about kinds of litigation in expanding or contracting litiga-
tion opportunities. The 1983 amendments even provide some 
support for that by inviting judges to restrict discovery if the 
expense seems unwarranted by "the importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation. "117 
Without seeming to realize it, Chayes hit upon a fundamental 
shift in judicial behavior. The theoretical ramifications of that 
shift are increasingly important in the academy, and resolution 
of these issues turns largely on reassessing the Fulleresque view 
of litigation, as Chayes suggested. 
3. Adjudication v. mediation- Another feature of public 
law litigation that Chayes focused on may be even more funda- · 
mental than managerial judging. Chayes noted the tendency of 
judges to sidestep their responsibility to devise remedies by 
pressuring the parties to negotiate a consent decree. He properly 
perceived that this sort of prodding could not easily be fit into 
the classical image of the judge as a decision maker, not a 
facilitator. 
As with the judicial management phenomenon, the idea of the 
judge as mediator was gaining popularity at the time Chayes was 
sel refused to drop the suit, the court could have asserted its powers of oversight 
of litigation to dismiss the suit. 
Id. at 349. Thus, resort to formal procedures may no longer be viewed as a proper alter-
native to employing the new informal mode. 
116. See Peckham, supra note 109. 
[T]he judge should consider his sense of the attorneys' diligence, experience, and 
competence. Since a structured pretrial can force attorneys to prepare, even a 
simple case can benefit from elaborate pretrial where the attorneys might other-
wise allow the case to fall into confusion. A judge should also be alert to the 
particularly combative attorney who, if the case is not actively managed during 
pretrial, might succeed in turning a trial that should be a molehill into a 
mountain. 
Id. at 781; see also Vance v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.R.D. 93 (S.D. Tex. 1987) 
(declaring mistrial because plaintiff's lawyer is inadequately prepared). 
117. See FEo. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). 
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writing, and it also applied to a much greater range of cases than 
Chayes appreciated. In part, this was a reaction to the increasing 
pressures of growing caseloads, but it also represented the feel-
ing of some judges that all or nothing outcomes in court often 
were inferior as a matter of justice to the negotiated outcomes 
that could result from · mediation. 118 The relation between the 
flexibility of negotiated outcomes and the incentives to settle lit-
igation was hardly a new insight, 119 but judges did not begin act-
ing on that insight in large numbers until the late 1970's. By 
1983 the practice had achieved such acceptance that it was en-
shrined in the amendments to the federal rules.120 
Managerial judging was originally designed to speed adjudica-
tion, but it lends itself to mediation as well because it provides 
the judge with much information about the case and many occa-
sions for inviting or persuading the litigants to consider alterna-
tives. But mediation is even more difficult to fit into the classical 
model of litigation. Thus, for decades after the federal rules were 
adopted in 1938, many judges felt that judicial involvement in 
the settlement process was inappropriate. The insight that the 
all or nothing results dictated by the law often will be less at-
tractive to the parties than a compromise in no way undermines 
this traditional reluctance. To the contrary, the law's preference 
for all or nothing results suggests that compromises are to be 
shunned. 
It is not surprising that public law litigation would strain the 
traditional view, however, because the remedy so often seems 
detached from the finding of a violation. As a consequence, one 
could say the all or nothing motif does not apply in such cases 
because it is so hard to know what the "all" might be, and al-
ways possible that the court will fashion something less than 
"all."121 
But the ambivalence in public law cases ran deeper; very often 
the consent decree was a negotiated resolution of both violation 
118. See Tone, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in SEMINARS FOR 
NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 57, 60 (1975). 
119. See Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt 
and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 750, 751 (1964) (seeing "fair" decision unattainable by law 
furthered by "judicial power to compromise between the often harsh alternatives of all-
or-nothing"). 
120. See FED. R. C1v. P. 16(c)(7). 
121. This possibility also exists in more traditional cases. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlan-
tic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (discussed 
supra note 65). In Boomer, the court declined an injunction against continued operation 
of defendant's cement plant and instead granted plaintiffs (farmers in the area) only the 
damages they had proven. 
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and remedy. This reality flowed easily from the nature of the 
problem courts confronted in framing decrees. The remedy 
problem in a prison conditions case, for example, arises because 
no single aspect of the prison's operations is necessarily uncon-
stitutional if considered apart from all the others. In Hutto v. 
Finney, 122 for example, the district court found the Arkansas 
prison system to violate the eighth amendment because it was "a 
dark and evil world completely alien to the free world."123 It 
then tried to prod the defendants to improve conditions. When 
that failed, the court imposed a specific injunction which, in 
part, set thirty days as the maximum sentence for confinement 
in isolation. The problem was that confining inmates in isolation 
for more than thirty days was not, standing alone, a constitu-
tional violation. The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the 
thirty day limitation because "[t]he length of time each inmate 
spent in isolation was simply one consideration among many" 
and, "taking the long and unhappy history of the litigation into 
account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive or-
der to insure against the risk of inadequate compliance."124 
If the problem with fashioning a decree is caused by the diffi-
culty of identifying exactly which features of the defendant's 
conduct constitute a violation, it is a short step to prodding the 
parties to make a deal on both violation and remedy. In taking 
that step, the court can build on the long history of consent de-
crees in antitrust and employment discrimination cases.1211 But 
once that step is taken, the distinguishing features of public law 
litigation seem to recede; if hard liability decisions can be 
avoided in those cases, they can be escaped in others as well. 
Moreover, to the extent the public law litigation cases take up a 
lot of judicial time and energy, it is attractive to use mediation 
to dispose of the other less weighty portion of the docket. 
The current tort crisis atmosphere reinforces this trend. 
Should tort plaintiffs be left to pursue the all or nothing result 
at trial or encouraged to accept a "fair" settlement? Where the 
122. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
123. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd 442 F.2d 304 (8th 
Cir. 1971), remanded, Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), rev'd by Finney 
v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), remanded, Finney v. Hutto, 
410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976), a{f'd, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 678 
(1978). In affirming, the Supreme Court quoted this part and noted that "[t]hat charac-
terization was amply supported by the evidence." Hutto, 437 U.S. at 681. 
124. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 687. For Chayes's 1982 update on remedial problems, see 
Chayes, supra note 25, at 45-56. 
125. See generally Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 
29 B.C.L. REV. 291 (1988). 
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main uncertainty is the proper amount of compensation, the 
judge can feel relatively comfortable urging acceptance of a fair 
amount, based on the verdicts obtained in similar cases, whether 
or not that suggestion can be backed up with punishment for the 
party who resists the judge's suggestions.126 But liability is often 
unclear; in such cases, judges may have more effective tools to 
capitalize on uncertainty, because liability often depends more 
on the judge's decisions than does the measure of damages, 
which is usually left to the jury. By suggesting proplaintiff or 
prodef endant inclinations on the legal issues, the judge can 
powerfully affect the settlement atmosphere. 127 Where the 
judge's influence is greatest, however, there are no referents like 
jury verdicts in other cases to guide the judge in selecting a set-
tlement figure. What is the right amount to settle a weak case? 
How does a judge develop rules for that? What will rules regard-
ing "fair" settlements of weak cases do to the substantive law, 
with its increasingly regulatory impetus, if they dilute the dis-
tinction between cases in which there should and should not be 
liability?128 
To recognize and explain the shift in attitude thus does noth-
ing to justify or confine it. Instead, one must again confront the 
concerns Chayes explored in connection with the judicial role in 
the negotiation of the structural litigation decree. Many scholars 
126. See, e.g., Kothe ·v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985). In Kothe, a medical mal-
practice action, the judge recommended at a pretrial conference that the case be settled 
for an amount between $20,000 and $30,000 and warned the parties that he would punish 
the dilatory party if the case were settled for such an amount at trial. When the parties 
settled for $20,000 on the first day of trial, the judge imposed sanctions on defendant. 
The court of appeals reversed. Recognizing that the law favors voluntary settlement of 
civil suits, it stated that "pressure tactics to coerce settlement simply are not permissi-
ble." Id. at 669. But it qualified this statement by pointing out that although the court 
had been aware during the pretrial conference that plaintiff would accept a figure in the 
$20,000 range, defendant had not known, adding that under these circumstances, defen-
dant "should not have been required to make an offer in this amount simply because the 
court wanted him to." Id. at 670. Given the rarity of appellate review of judicial pressure 
to settle, this qualification about full disclosure seriously dilutes the importance of the 
earlier statement regarding pressure tactics. 
127. For a prominent example, consider the settlement promotion strategy used by 
Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation. In his dealings with both the plaintiffs' 
and the defendants' attorneys during settlement negotiations, the judge played up the 
possibility that he would rule unfavorably to the side being assessed on legal issues relat-
ing to liability. To defendants, he stressed his intention to adopt the plaintiffs' theory 
that all manufacturers were liable for injuries caused by herbicides manufactured by any. 
See P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 154-55 (1986). To plaintiffs' counsel, he hinted 
strongly that he would have to grant a directed verdict to defendants on the issue of 
causation. See id. at 160-61. In Professor Schuck's words, the judge "played a massive 
game of chicken." Id. at 259. 
128. See Marcus, Apocalypse Now? (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 1267, 1291-95 
(1987). 
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are now exploring these difficulties. Although they are address-
ing a phenomenon that is not the same as the one Chayes dis-
cussed, they begin ordinarily with a bow to him. That bow is a 
recognition that his work relates directly to these current issues. 
C. Academic Renaissance 
Whether or not there is a malaise in legal scholarship gener-
ally, one can reasonably suggest that there has been one in pro-
cedural scholarship. To put things in context, recall John Hart 
Ely's explanation in 197 4 for the persistence of what he viewed 
as a misperception of the Erie doctrine: "Part of the fault has 
surely been the commentators': to one accustomed to the sav-
agery of constitutional criticism, writers on procedure seem 
strangely, if refreshingly, accepting."129 Much as he may have 
been refreshed at the attitudes he encountered, Ely clearly felt 
that a bit of savagery would have punctured the balloon long 
before. But Ely's article, which Chayes himself labeled "the 
work of an adept,"130 was the work of one adept at traditional 
doctrinal analysis. Moreover, while it has perhaps not been 
savaged, Ely's article has been forcefully criticized for narrow-
ness of vision.181 Whatever one's view of savagery, however, 
there is some merit to the suggestion that in the mid-1970's, pro-
cedural scholarship was in doldrums. 
The situation has changed, largely in reaction to the forces 
mentioned in the preceding section. By 1979, Owen Fiss was 
able to report that "the academy is today filled with talk about 
procedure,"182 and it seems fair to suggest that procedure has 
experienced a renaissance as the focus of creative talents. It is 
not merely that proceduralists suddenly changed their spots, but 
also that new blood took interest in procedural issues. Perhaps 
outside influence is normally needed in procedure (and in most 
other areas). John Coffee recently suggested that, as war is too 
important to leave to the generals, procedure may be. too impor-
tant to leave to the proceduralists.188 But that would not seem to 
129. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698 (1974). 
130. Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REv. 741, 741 (1974). 
131. Professor Burbank has dissected Ely's treatment of the Rules Enabling Act and 
found it wanting. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1023-27, 1033-35, 1187-88 (1982). 
132. Fiss, supra note 91, at 5. 
133. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 877 (1987). 
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be a problem with an eclectic scholar like Chayes, and it is not 
surprising to find commentators reporting that the Public Law 
Litigation article "set the tone for so much procedural scholar-
ship of late."134 Hence, it is worthwhile to reflect on the nature 
of the changes that have occurred, for they draw on Chayes's 
work. 
1. Theory- There is a tendency to treat procedure as the 
machinery of the law. Charles Clark's image of procedure as the 
Handmaid of Justice1311 set the tone for a generation of scholars. 
In the abstract, of course, the theory is that procedure should be 
nothing more than machinery, and that outcomes should depend 
on the application of substantive law. Courts continue to pro-
claim that results must be determined by the substantive merits 
of the cases even in the face of flagrant violation of procedural 
rules by litigants who might be trying thereby to frustrate the 
substantive rights of their adversaries. 136 Although no thinking 
134. Garth, Nagel & Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Per-
spectives From an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 
389 (1988). 
135. See Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297 (1938). Flush with his 
success in presiding over the drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Clark used 
this lecture to encourage vigilance lest the new rules assume importance comparable to 
substantive law. As he explained: 
A handmaid, no matter how devoted, seems never averse to becoming mistress of 
a household should opportunity offer. Just so do rules of procedure tend to as-
sume a too obtrusive place in the attentions of judges and lawyers-unless, in-
deed, they are continually restricted to their proper and subordinate role. 
Id. at 297. Professor Subrin has explained that "[f]or Clark, procedural history was a 
sort of morality play in which the demon, procedural technicality, keeps trying to thwart 
a regal substantive law." Subrin, supra note 106, at 973. 
136. The starting point for this attitude is Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), which 
held that a court could not, consistent with due process, strike a defendant's answer and 
enter default as punishment for disobedience of the court's order. For a recent applica-
tion, see Phoceene Sous-Marine v. United States Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 
1982). The defendant there obtained a continuance of the trial date by presenting the 
court with a telegram stating that Lecocq, its principal officer, could not participate in a 
trial for medical reasons. On learning that the telegram was phony, and that Lecocq had 
tried to cover up the deception by asking a doctor to lie, the district court entered an 
order finding defendant in default. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that 
"Lecocq's deception related not to the merits of the controversy but rather to a periph-
eral matter: whether Lecocq was in fact too ill to attend trial on October 10." Id. at 806. 
Several courts continue to insist that ultimate sanctions not be used for disobedience of 
discovery rules unless lesser sanctions are considered and found insufficient to undo the 
effects of the failure to comply with discovery. See Titus v. Mercedes Benz, 695 F.2d 746 
(3d Cir. 1982). Further, to save litigants from sanctions caused by the misbehavior of 
their lawyers, the Third Circuit now requires that before ultimate sanctions are used, the 
court itself send notice of the motion for sanctions directly to the client. See Dunbar v. 
Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1987). 
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, has become more receptive to punishing litigants with 
sanctions that go to the merits. Thus, in Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988), it up-
held a conviction in a criminal case where defendant was prohibited from calling two 
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observer could believe that outcomes never depend on procedure 
rather than substantive law, the rather negative Handmaid im-
age probably contributed to a lackluster impression of procedure 
in the trendiest academic circles because few scholars would 
want _to be always the bridesmaid, never the bride. Perhaps as a 
consequence, scholars tended toward the rather mechanical re-
calibration of rules instead of reexamining their theoretical un-
derpinnings, 137 a tendency that contributed to the malaise. 
Getting back to theoretical basics is an effective method of 
dealing with this malaise, and Chayes provided a significant 
nudge in that direction. As Melvin Eisenberg recognized in his 
memorial essay on Fuller, "The development of public law liti-
gation challenges in an important way Fuller's view of the limits 
of litigation. Chayes's article marks the beginning of an effort to 
rationalize this development .... "138 From this beginning, the 
challenge has gained momentum. Eisenberg, for his part, found 
Fuller's framework "the best worked out and most persuasive 
perspective from which to criticize this development."139 Others, 
perhaps more sympathetic to the development of public law liti-
gation itself, have taken a different attitude. Most notably, 
Owen Fiss has challenged the private law precepts of Fuller's 
views and propounded in their place the idea that the primary 
and most legitimate role of judges is to give expression to our 
"public values."140 
At this level, the procedural debate is anything but mechani-
cal. Instead, it focuses on the assumptions underlying Fuller's 
view that the adversary system is essential to the "moral force" 
of a judgment. Is the adversary system a good thing, putting 
aside history? Should the parties control the litigation them-
witnesses because they were not identified in response to pretrial discovery. The Court 
was not concerned that a lesser sanction might have protected the prosecution's inter-
ests: "Regardless of whether prejudice to the prosecution could have been avoided in this 
particular case, it is plain that the case fits into the category of willful misconduct in 
which the severest sanction is appropriate." Id. at 656. See generally Note, The Emerg-
ing Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1033 (1978). 
137. Professor Hazard, writing in 1963, reported that "[w]ith but few exceptions, the 
product of procedural scholarship in the last 25 years is conspicuously bare of any seri-
ous attention to what. might be called the philosophy of procedure." G. HAZARD, RE-
SEARCH IN C1v1L PROCEDURE 63 (1963). He concluded that "(i]t would seem overdue to 
give greater heed to the repeated calls for filling the theoretical vacuum in procedure." 
Id. at 88-89. 
138. Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Es-
say for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 431 (1978). 
139. Id. 
140. See Fiss, supra riote 91, at 5-17. 
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selves in the way envisioned by Fuller, given the wider social 
importance of litigation? Should the judge be encouraged to 
take control-in the manner Chayes described-thereby sup-
planting the parties as the prime actor? 
It is hard to understand why these basic questions have not 
seemed central until relatively recently. Clark's procedural rules 
had an ambivalent effect on the enduring validity of the Fuller-
esque vision. On the one hand, in keeping with the Handmaid of 
Justice image, Clark's rules seem designed to make procedural 
rules unimportant to the outcome. The relaxation of fetters on 
pleading, discovery, amendment, and the like was designed to 
leave the contours of litigation open as much and as long as pos-
sible so that, at the culmination of the process, the judge, as a 
Fulleresque impartial decider, could determine who should pre-
vail. On the other hand, the very laxness of the rules bespeaks 
the equity orientation, and it seems that Clark actually expected 
this orientation to encourage judges to treat litigation as some-
thing more than simple dispute resolution in order to achieve 
larger social purposes. i.u So questions about the validity of 
Fuller's view were present all along due to the Federal Rules' 
inherent relaxation of the tethers on litigation, but this potential 
was largely overlooked due to the shared culture of judicial non-
intervention that led judges to maintain a "hands off'' attitude. 
The difficulties presented by school desegregation and similar 
structural litigation overcame that reticence in the ways Chayes 
described. The perceived "boom" in litigation then prompted 
widespread abandonment of the ethos of judicial passivity in the 
case management and judicial mediation movements. These de-
velopments, in turn, are leading to both theoretical and com-
parativist examination of the ramifications and continuing vital-
ity of the adversary model1'2 ; this process is fueled by the vision 
of the judge as central actor in public law litigation. 
141. See Subrin, supra note 106, at 966. 
142. For an ambitious recent example, see M. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND 
STATE AUTHORITY (1986). Drawing on Continental and Anglo-American experiences, 
Damaska develops two theoretical visions of the state and relates them to procedure. 
One type of state he labels the "reactive state." It is designed to· promote order and 
ensure that citizens may pursue the goals they choose for themselves. The "activist 
state," by way of contrast, energetically pursues its vision of the good life through a 
vigorous regulatory program that places much less stock in the individual initiative of 
the citizens. Damaska's view of procedure in the activist state looks strikingly like 
Clark's, and even uses the same images: 
[P]rocedural rules and regulation in an activist state occupy a much less impor-
tant and independent position: procedure is basically a handmaiden of substan-
tive law .... A proper procedure is one that increases the probability-or maxi-
mizes the likelihood-of achieving a substantively accurate result rather than 
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Passing beyond these basic strands of disagreement, one finds 
that subsidiary issues have begun to flower into areas of theoret-
ical reexamination. Many have explored the ramifications of ju-
dicial intervention in local political institutions through govern-
ment by decree. 143 Besides raising questions about whether 
judges should keep their hands out of certain kinds of cases, this 
analysis traces the ways in which the new tasks judges under-
take depend on changing the procedures they use to accomplish 
their objectives. For example, how does a judge adapt the very 
limited resources of the court to achieving institutional change? 
If the answer is to delegate tasks to others, such as special mas-
ters, what are the consequences of that action for the idea that 
the judge should personally fashion the relief? Whether ap-
proached on separation of powers or other grounds, these 
problems present basic issues of procedural theory. 
Provocative though his article was, Chayes did not start this 
shift toward more basic questions, as others had already force-
fully challenged the American devotion to the adversary ideal. u, 
Neither was the willingness to reexamine basic premises limited 
to the procedural issues on which Chayes focused. m Yet the 
Chayes article occupies an important niche in the development 
of the phenomenon. 
2. Empirical inquiry- Chayes began his article by quoting a 
"fashionably empirical slogan" by Holmesu6 and then observing 
that, even though Holmes seemed to endorse an empirical anti-
dote to nineteenth-century formalism, he was actually not em-
pirical. After World War I, of course, the realist movement em-
braced extreme forms of empiricism. Depressed by such efforts 
as Underhill Moore's monumental and ultimately inconclusive 
one that successfully effects notions of fairness or protects some collateral sub-
stantive value. In this sense, then, the procedural law of the activist state follows 
substantive law as faithfully as its shadow. 
Id. at 148. 
143. E.g., Diver, The Judge as Political Power Broker: Superintending Structural 
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979); Frug, supra note 103. 
144. Perhaps the most notable example during the period when Chayes was writing 
was Judge Frankel's 1974 lecture before the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York, later published as Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1031 (1975). Judge Frankel recommended that the profession "question the pre-
mise that adversariness is ultimately and invariably good," id. at 1052, suggesting that 
the pursuit of truth might be regarded as a preferable objective; see id. at 1055-57. 
145. Professor Fiss thus recently suggested that theoretical reexamination character-
izes current American legal scholarship across a wide spectrum. See Fiss, The Death of 
Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) ("Today everyone is talking about theory."). 
146. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1281-82 (quoting Holmes's advice that scholars 
focus on "what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious"). 
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study of parking in New Haven,147 most legal academics re-
treated from such endeavors. Chayes himself endorsed such 
studies but did not conduct them, preferring to rely on armchair 
empiricism supported by anecdotal evidence that was illustrated · 
by reported cases and other materials he had at hand. 
Real empirical analysis is regaining popularity, in many ways 
as a result of the fundamental reappraisal of our basically adver-
sary system of civil justice. Many are properly uneasy with tam-
pering with that system on the basis of armchair empiricism 
rather than hard data from social science research. Such re-
search may even be used to shed light on the Fulleresque ques-
tion of whether the adversary system contributes to the "moral 
force" of a judgment. In this connection, the work of Walker and 
Thibaut, in trying to use social science testing pro9edures to 
gauge the importance of adversary techniques and participation 
in the process on acceptance of outcomes, offers promise for 
more than armchair speculation on such questions.148 At the 
same time, we must be cautious in embracing such results and 
recognize that others have cogently questioned their methods (as 
always seems to happen when such testing procedures are 
employed). 149 
Other types of social science research could be employed to 
provide hard data that would be useful in evaluating the 
147. For a discussion of this research, see Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Em-
pirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195, 
264-303 (1980). 
148. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(1975); Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541 (1978); Walker, 
Lind & Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. 
REV. 1401 (1979). For further work in the area, see E. LIND & T. TYLER, THE Soc.IAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). 
These efforts seem to overcome one of the problems of using empirical research-the 
need to explore the matters that are important to theoretical inquiry. On this, consider 
Stone, From A Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149 (1981): 
[O]ne measure of organization of law scholarly activities is the extent to which 
those engaged in gathering data respond to what the theorists need for the test-
ing of their theories; some coherence would be confirmed if the theorizers even 
read the empiricists' work. Does anyone really believe, though, that those who do 
empirical research on the criminal justice system have a clear idea of what those 
who are doing Big Theory Justice are about, or vice versa? Doubtless, the direc-
tion of empirical research in law is most strongly influenced by the availability of 
grants, the techniques that are fashionable in social science research, the kind of 
research that is technologically feasible, and what sounds exciting. The data that 
the rest of law scholarship might need, or even find useful, do not orient the 
empiricists' thinking. 
Id. at 1155. 
149. See Damasks, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1088, 1095-1100 (1975). 
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armchair empiricist's reaction to trends in litigation. For him-
self, Chayes was content simply to assert that "the dominating 
characteristic" of modern federal litigation was the shift to what 
he viewed as public law cases. Surely this could not be sup-
ported with statistics because the absolute number of such cases 
at the height of their popularity was quite small. But statistics 
are a dangerous way to measure the significance of litigation ac-
tivity. To take a notable example, during his last years on the 
Court, Justice Powell was fond of citing the growth in the num-
ber of civil rights suits as proof that there was no need to pro-
mote such litigation because there was already too much of it. 150 
Statistics, of course, cannot' tell us what the proper number of 
suits should be. 
More rigorous work is now being done. Thus, there is now 
some statistical evidence to counter Justice Powell's concerns. 161 
Both the Rand Corporation and the Civil Litigation Research 
Project of the University of Wisconsin have gathered data on 
what occurs in civil litigation in this country. Already this work 
has yielded results. For example, a study of jury verdicts has 
shown that, at least in two metropolitan areas, juries do return 
high verdicts against deep pocket defendants, confirming the as-
sumptions of many.m But another study found that the fre-
quency of large verdicts is not so great as some might surmise, 
and that the frequency of judicial reduction of such verdicts is 
greater than many might suppose. 163 
It is harder to be confident about the promise of this work in 
dealing with basic questions, however. The work is extremely 
150. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 555-56 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that since enactment of Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 (1982), civil rights suits have "increased geometrically"). More generally, Justice 
Powell seems to have been inclined to rely on gut reaction empiricism. Consider, for 
example, his remarks when he dissented from the promulgation of amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1980 on the ground that the amendments did not go 
far enough to curb what he perceived as abuses of discovery: "One must doubt whether 
empirical evidence would demonstrate that untrammeled discovery actually contributes 
to the just resolution of disputes. If there is a disagreement about that, there is none 
whatever about the effect of discovery practices upon the average citizen's ability to af-
ford legal remedies." Dissenting Statement of Powell, J., 446 U.S. 997, 999 (1980). On the 
empirical results, see infra note 155. 
151. See Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642-43 (1987) ("Both national data ... and our findings about a 
key federal district suggest that the image of a civil rights litigation explosion is over-
stated and borders on myth."). 
152. Hammitt, Carroll & Relles, Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 751, 754-56 (1985). 
153. See M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, POSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS 
(1987). 
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time consuming and expensive, the kind of problem that ham-
strung much of the realist activity during the 1930's. More sig-
nificantly, as the realists also discovered, the results often fail to 
answer the most important questions without interpretation 
that resembles the kind of armchair empiricism in which Justice 
Powell was inclined to indulge. Take the current debate about 
the existence of a litigation "explosion." After intense data-gath-
ering in a number of jurisdictions, University of Wisconsin 
scholars were able to offer their judgment that there was no liti-
gation explosion, or at least that current levels of litigation ac-
tivity fit well within cyclical trends in frequency of litigation. m 
Beyond doubt, this work was important in providing a substi-
tute for the kind of shoot-from-the-hip arguments that others 
have advanced using statistical data about increased filings in 
court. At the same time, selection of research methods and inter-
pretation of the data often depend on a set of assumptions that 
leave open different conclusions.11111 Ultimately, hard data, al-
though it may show whether juries are awarding more against 
deep pocket defendants, probably cannot show whether Ameri-
cans are suing too much because there is always a problem of 
identifying the baseline. To take Justice Powell's concerns, it is 
certain that the right baseline is not the level of civil rights liti-
gation in Mississippi in the 1920's, but beyond that, we have no 
workable way of deciding what· is the correct starting point. 
Even with the learning afforded by survey research, we will still 
have to rely to a significant degree on armchair empiricism. 
In that connection, it is important to note a variant on the 
social science research idea-comparative data on what courts 
do. Judge Posner has receQtly suggested that the way to measure 
154. See Trubek, Sarat, Felsteiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Liti-
gation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983). For a contrasting view of the statistics, see Marvell, 
Caseload Growth--Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (1987). 
155. To take an illustration pertinent to Justice Powell's concerns about discovery, it 
is interesting to note the differences in perspective resulting from two efforts to develop 
empirical data. The Federal Judicial Center sponsored a study of over 3000 civil cases in 
six federal districts to assess concerns about excessive discovery. It found that in 52% of 
the cases, there was no indication in the court tiles that any discovery had occurred. Only 
5% of the tiles indicated that more than 10 discovery requests had occurred. P. CON-
NOLLY, E. HOOLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS 
28 (1978). Based on interviews with Chicago litigators, however, Professor Brazil found 
that in at least 50% of complex cases, at least one party believes that it has avoided 
revealing something important despite discovery. Brazil, Views From the Front Lines: 
Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 217. As with the efforts to verify or discredit the idea that there is a 
litigation "explosion," these results show the difficulties in using empirical research to 
answer the most fundamental questions. 
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the value of innovative court procedures would be to test them 
in a sufficiently large number of cases to have statistical signifi-
cance.166 Indeed, test programs with such techniques as 
mandatory arbitration of smaller cases have already proceeded 
in selected districts, partly in an effort to generate such data. m 
This idea may hold promise, but it puts scientific inquiry on a 
collision course with the courts' goal of dispensing justice. Judge 
Posner's specific suggestion was that the utility of summary jury 
trials as devices for expediting cases be evaluated by randomly 
selecting one percent of all cases ready for trial for such treat-
ment and refusing to use it in another randomly selected one 
percent of such cases (the control group). As a matter of social 
science research, that might yield reliable data. 1118 At the same 
time, however, using the courtroom as a laboratory in this fash-
ion tends to undermine its effectiveness, at least in these cases, 
as either an ,institution for expressing public values (the Fiss 
ideal) or as a medium for resolving disputes. How exactly does 
one explain to the litigants who fall in one category that they 
may not employ the procedures that are being forced on the liti-
gants in the other category?1119 
156. See Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986). 
157. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 500 (mandating nonbinding arbitration for all actions 
seeking less than $100,000 in damages). 
158. Posner, supra note 156, at 374-75. 
159. Some district judges seem to lampoon Judge Posner's proposals. Consider, for 
example, the remarks of one district judge in Kentucky who rejected a Seventh Circuit 
holding that district courts could not require litigants to participate in summary jury 
trials: 
It is clearly true, as Judge Posner points in his insightful article, that the ef-
fectiveness of summary jury trals has not been scientifically verified. I for one 
would welcome a controlled experiment along the lines he suggests to see if it 
can be verified• and in what types of cases summary jury trials are most use-
ful. ... It is interesting to note, however, that a controlled scientific experiment 
such as that suggested by Judge Posner cannot be effectively conducted unless 
summary jury trials are mandatory. 
It is true that to date we have only unscientific anecdotal evidence of the ef-
fectiveness of summary jury trials. But not everything in life can be scientifically 
verified. I have only unscientific anecdotal evidence that Hawaii is more beauti-
ful than Covington [Ky.], but I intend to expend a considerable sum to go there 
as soon as I get the chance. 
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49 (E.D. Ky. 1988). 
Posner seems to recognize that his suggestion is not politically feasible, and he there-
fore follows it up with other survey type suggestions designed to provide some feedback 
on the utility of summary jury trials besides random assignment of cases. See id. at 375-
76 (suggesting that judges could record information about cases in which summary jury 
trials were used so that a comparison could be made to other cases, or that the Federal 
Judicial Center could survey lawyers anonymously to determine whether they find the 
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In sum, Chayes's bow to empiricism anticipated academic de-
velopments that are actually empirical, even though his work, 
like that of Holmes, obviously was not. Much as this work may 
dispel some illusions about features of litigation and confirm 
suspicions about others, it will probably not provide a substitute 
for armchair empiricism on the kind of issues Chayes raised. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
The above tale offers some support for the critics of legal 
scholarship. Chayes's impressionistic article is almost bereft of 
either usable doctrinal analysis or reliable empirical proof. Its 
success seems to have depended on gut reactions. Although it 
has been cited by a wide variety of important figures, the article 
has often been invoked as an ornament rather than followed. It 
does not tie in directly with the pressing legal problems of today 
because it is limited in focus to a type of litigation that is in 
decline. If renowned and innovative works can be criticized on 
this ground, there would seem to be little reason for confidence 
about the fate of more ordinary legal scholarship. Indeed, one 
might even characterize the success of the Public Law Litigation 
article as evidence of the ancien regime impasse in legal scholar-
ship, a bit of fluff that got a lot of attention because it was 
prominently placed and trendy. 
There is another lesson to be drawn from this analysis, how-
ever. The article's lack of doctrinal content and reliance on the 
informed reader's gut reaction distinguish it from other legal 
scholarship but not from all scholarship. It resembles the 
armchair empiricism of some social science scholarship such as 
the sociological work of the early twentieth century. That work 
relied for its force on the gut reaction of the reader that the 
writer's observations about behavior in society were correct. In 
the social sciences, work since World War II has turned increas-
ingly away from such efforts in favor of harder data from survey 
research. As suggested above, such empiricism is unlikely ever to 
answer many of the more important questions about litigation. 
It seems peculiarly unworkable for study of the kinds of issues 
Chayes was addressing: contrasting the way judges actually ap-
proach their function at present with the classical model of judi-
procedure helpful). Something along these lines has been done, disclosing overwhelming 
support among lawyers for active judicial intervention. See Brazil, What Lawyers Want 
From Judges in the Settlement Arena, 106 F.R.D. 85 (1985). 
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cial involvement in all probability cannot be reduced to hard 
data. Here one must proceed in large measure by gut reaction. 
Standing alone, however, armchair empiricism has little schol-
arly importance unless it is tied in with some theoretical frame-
work. This, of course, is exactly what Chayes did by showing in 
essence, that the classical model of litigation was itself an ancien 
regime construct that failed to acco"!-.mt for much of what actu-
ally happened in American courtrooms. Because this point had 
not been made effectively before, Chayes's observation was an 
important stride. Surely the judges who knew they were reacting 
to the new pressures of litigation rarely contrasted their real-life 
experiences with the Fulleresque ideal. At most, they were aware 
that some of the things they were doing had been frowned upon 
by some of their predecessors. For these judges, bringing this re-
ality face-to-face with a coherent theoretical framework was 
valuable. 
For the law professor, Chayes provided something more as 
well-he called the attention of the academy to actual phenom-
ena that needed to be considered. Beyond that, he offered an 
analytical framework that could provide a starting point for fu-
ture work by identifying the problems to be addressed. The fact 
that he merely raised and did not try to provide definitive an-
swers for these questions seems an unimportant criticism. Al-
though many have pursued these themes, it would be hard to 
say that they have developed final answers to the problems. 
More significant is the resilience of the analytical framework, 
which is adapted to the problems of a new era of litigation 
stresses that Chayes apparently did not foresee. Indeed, it has 
been overtly adopted in a number of areas. 160 Thus, while 
Chayes's brand of public law litigation has been eclipsed as a 
phenomenon by the tort "crisis," the growth of managerial judg-
ing, and the related enthusiasm for settlement promotion, 
Chayes's article remains an important starting point for one who 
wants to evaluate the problems of the present and the future. 
Seen in this light, Chayes's article could be a symbol of the 
flexibility of legal scholarship. It shows that nontraditional work 
can be used to reinforce and redirect more traditional doctrinal 
160. See Coffin, supra note 31, at 989; Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long Term 
Economic Relations Under Classic, Neoclassic and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 854, 891-92 (1978); Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing 
the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 918-19 (1979); Powers, Sex Segregation and the 
Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55, 101; Note, 
Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned Upon Vacatur of Entered Judg-
ments, 96 YALE L.J. 860, 871 (1987). 
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analysis. It suggests that when theory fails to fit reality, the 
academy can begin to reassess theory, and that an ordinarily li-
brary-bound subject can be broadened to encompass empirical 
research and interdisciplinary work. 
Lest this present too sanguine a view of the situation, some 
notes of caution are also in order. Most important is to recognize 
the possible malaise that Chayes's discussion suggests for proce-
dural scholarship. As indicated above, the triumph of equity has 
relaxed the tethers on decisionmaking by trial level judges. To 
some extent, this relaxation reflects the inherent difficulty of ar-
ticulating trans-substantive rules to govern the kind of case-spe-
cific determinations judges must make on such issues as inter-
vention. Thus, one could treat the substantive uncertainty at the 
center of Chayes's work161 as a symptom of the malaise that has 
overcome much modern legal analysis, as balancing tests dis-
place more precise and rigid rules.162 As indicated above, the 
task for the future is to deal with this ambiguity; unless it can 
be conquered, the malaise will infect our entire litigation system 
and not just legal scholarship. 
From the perspective of scholarship, it is equally important to 
dispel the implicit cause-and-effect suggestion of much of the 
above discussion. I have linked a wide variety of phenomena and 
ideas to Chayes's work, 163 but that does not mean that these 
were caused by it. To the contrary, it is likely that much, if not 
all, of the work others have done would have been done had this 
article not appeared. Just as judges behaved in nontraditional 
ways without prodding from Chayes, so would others have re-
acted to these developments had Chayes not written about 
them. Some of this scholarship had already appeared, and much 
more must have been in progress before Public Law Litigation 
was published. Quite possibly, there would have been just as 
much academic work had Chayes never turned to these 
problems. 
Moreover, one must acknowledge that others, particularly 
Owen Fiss, have gone much further than Chayes in constructing 
alternative theories. As noted, Chayes's article was principally 
descriptive in its enumeration of contrasts between the classical 
model and the modern reality, a point Fiss has hastened to 
make.164 Chayes did not really propose a new thesis, but only 
161. See, e.g., supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
162. E.g., Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 
(1987). 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 83-159. 
164. See Fiss, supra note 91, at 36. 
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drew attention to the divergence between reality and the Fuller-
esque ideal. At least some who have pursued these problems fur-
ther in his wake have focused primarily on attacking develop-
ments rather than fashioning new theories. The work is still 
obviously unfinished. 
Finally, if one accepts the proposition that the phenomena 
Chayes described are directly related to the recent trends to-
ward judicial management of litigation and promotion of settle-
ment, both in terms of the actual forces that prompted judges to 
behave in certain ways and in terms of the theoretical issues in-
volved, one is left with something of an anomaly. The propo-
nents of the unconventional judicial activity discussed by 
Chayes would generally be described as "liberals," favoring this 
innovation to achieve social changes through litigation. But 
many of these scholars find themselves at odds with the next 
step in the development Chayes chronicled: the impetus toward 
general promotion of judicial management and settlement. Re-
acting to these symptoms of the shift in judicial roles, they en-
dorse judicial restraint in the classical uninvolved model. Thus 
Professor Fiss suggests that judges should be restricted to giving 
voice to public values (presumably via judgments rendered in 
the classical mode), and Professor Resnik chastises judges for 
their preoccupation with output at the expense of outcomes liti-
gated in the classical fashion. So the closing point is that schol-
arly insights sometimes lead in directions the scholar finds dis-
comfiting. But that conclusion underscores the importance of 
the dispassionate scholar who observes and explores without a 
stake in a particular outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though a new scholarly movement such as law and eco-
nomics can have widespread effects on the law, a single article is 
not likely to do so. Legal scholarship is not, after all, like sci-
ence, where a single breakthrough can have such an effect. Con-
sider, for example, the scientists who shared the 1987 Nobel 
physics prize. Their article on superconductivity at much higher 
temperatures than before believed possible was described as 
"breaking a sort of magic barrier" and "turning the world of 
physics on its ear in the space of a year."165 
165. Gleick, 2 Get Nobel for Unlocking Superconductor Secret, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 
1987, at 1, col. 1. 
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Chayes's Public Law Litigation article did not have such dra-
matic effects. Indeed, one may question whether it had any ef-
fect, since the course of litigation and scholarship would proba-
bly have been much the same had the article not been 
published. In law, however, one may also question whether it is 
desirable to promote such breakthroughs since law is a human 
endeavor and insights that never occurred to anybody before 
may be too remote from experience to be helpful.166 The value of 
Chayes's article is that it builds on experience and prompts eval-
uation of that experience in light of other considerations that 
had not been brought to bear on the phenomena described. No 
one should expect this sort of scholarship as steady work. Sea 
changes in law are relatively rare, and few are positioned to seize 
the time and attach their names to such changes. Although some 
law professors may abandon the law and become social scien-
tists, very· few can hope to emulate Chayes's success in Public 
Law Litigation. 
166. See Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986) (sug-
gesting that "brilliant" paradigm-shifting work is dangerous in law and in economics 
because the brilliant insight is unlikely to occur to anyone but the brilliant person, while 
law and economics both deal with the behavior of more ordinary people). 

